There is much anticipation toward the upcoming BRICS super summit in Kazan, Russia, in the non-Western part of the world. The stakes are high. A role the BRICS currently play on the global stage requires new strategic decisions on their part. Not only to accelerate de-monopolization and de-dollarization. But also to control current crises and prevent the emergence of new regional crises.
According to the statement of Russian Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov – 32 counties confirmed their participation in the BRICS summit in Russia’s city of Kazan on October 22-24th. Among them, as many as 24 states will be represented by their heads of state. In addition, secretaries general of several international organizations, including the current UN head Antonio Guterres will take part in the event. Without any doubt, the Summit in Kazan will be the most important international meeting this year in the whole world. In addition, Ushakov assesses that „it can turn into the largest foreign policy event that has ever been held in our country”.
The popularity of BRICS in most of the world is a consequence of the search for an alternative. One order, the unipolar one that was characterized by the dominance of the USA and the political West – practically no longer exists. This second, multipolar one that will be characterized by the balance of power in world politics is just being established.
The task of the BRICS is to establish a new multipolar order as quickly as possible.
The task of BRICS is to establish a new order as soon as possible. Of course, realizing such a task is not at all simple. That is why BRICS needs time, a lot of negotiations, testing of proposed solutions and above all – patience. And that is why it seems that BRICS is still an insufficiently defined platform, an atypical international initiative, with a questionable capacity to absorb new members. Despite everything, the popularity of BRICS is growing, so the line in front of the “reception department” is also long. Many would like to join the BRICS.
However, there are no European countries among those countries (not counting the European part of the post-Soviet space and Turkey, because in political contextualization of the adjective “European” regarding those geographical areas there are always discussions about where and how to classify them in a geopolitical sense), except maybe Serbia. The representative of Serbia will participate in the meeting in Kazan, but at what level – that will not be known until the last moment.
Vladimir Putin, as the host of the meeting, sent an invitation to the President of Serbia, but that invitation remained without an official response. For the EU, the very trip to Kazan is problematic in itself and an indication that European integration is being abandoned, so the pressure on the President of Serbia regarding this issue is easily noticeable. Within the EU, they perceive BRICS not only as a competitive, but to a certain extent also as a hostile platform. Logically, every appearance of an alternative is a threat to the collective West, and the construction of a new multipolar order is a huge challenge.
As a result, unlike the situation in other parts of the world, in Europe we detect three different narratives about BRICS. BRICS is associated with great malice, great doubts and great expectations. The malice is shown in the construction of a negative image of BRICS and the continuous portrayal of that platform and its members in a negative light. By comparing the selected and targeted indicators of economic power, it is explained that the BRICS countries lag behind the USA and the EU in every respect, and that they are therefore incapable of building any alternative. BRICS is a “poor man’s club” and therefore cannot compete with the united and homogeneous Collective West. In addition, problematic matters concerning bilateral relations between individual BRICS members are often highlighted, the most frequent being pointing to the complex Chinese-Indian relations. If these bilateral relations are bad, then there can be no strong joint cooperation either. This narrative is the dominant, the most widespread, and is clearly constructed as a means of carrying out psychological-propaganda operations.
The importance of BRICS is clear, there is no doubt that the potential exists to create an alternative, but the question remains: how will it happen and to what extent?
Unlike this first, propagandistic narrative, the second is more objective and based on caution. It is mainly used by proponents of the realist school of thought in international relations. The importance of BRICS is understood, there is no doubt that there is potential for building an alternative, but it is questionable how it will play out and to what extent? Collective West has built a clear hierarchical organizational structure, it is known what is whose role, which organization serves for what and how decisions are made.
At the top is the USA, which leads the G7 within which strategic decisions are coordinated, below are the international financial institutions – the IMF and the World Bank – which elaborate and concretize those strategic decisions in the domain for which they are in charge, and in the next echelon are NATO and the EU with their own scope of actions. BRICS was created as a counterpart to the G7, but BRICS does not function like the G7. Since the character of the organization is different, within BRICS there is no hegemon capable of establishing a hierarchy, the organizational structure is designed differently, with complex negotiation and decision-making mechanisms. Ultimately, in order to make a decision within BRICS, consensus is necessary, and reaching consensus in political practice is not at all easy.
Also, BRICS has had two unpleasant situations related to enlargement since last year. The invitation to Argentina was sent just before the presidential elections, in which, completely surprisingly, Javier Milei won. With Milei, Argentina is changing its foreign policy course, when world politics is viewed from Buenos Aires, BRICS is no longer on the horizon. At the same time, Saudi Arabia neither accepted nor rejected the invitation. For the BRICS reputation, it is extremely important that such inconveniences do not occur, because such things prove the seriousness of the approach. These are the reasons why, even though the importance of BRICS is understood, and despite the fact that the “direction of movement” is understood, there remains a doubt about the “intensity of that movement”. In general, the advocates of this approach would prefer to wait with the assessments of the BRICS Summit and the possible placement of European states, until the “intensity of movement” of the BRICS is more clearly assessed.
At the Kazan’ summit, the BRICS can show that it is possible to effectively de-monopolize the world financial system and build momentum for the subsequent de-dollarization of the global economy.
The third narrative can be seen in the works of European sovereigntists, who have high expectations. Recently, Emmanuel Todd, an influential French intellectual, stated that the developments in Ukraine may contribute to the disintegration of NATO and that after that Europe will finally be independent from the influence of the USA. Despite the fact that part of the quoted statement can be called overly optimistic, Todd is basically right – the “resovereignation” of European states is not possible as long as NATO exists. It goes without saying, since BRICS is a platform for establishing the balance of power in international relations, then its strengthening is desirable in every respect for the “resovereignation” of Europe. Hence the high expectations. Thanks to the strengthening of BRICS, Europe can harbor hopes (or illusions, time will tell) about equal participation in the multipolar order, with Europe being one of the poles of that multipolar order. Although the number of BRICS sympathizers in various European countries is not negligible, the fact is that they have a narrowed media-political space for expressing their views and that they are atomized, disconnected, each acting for themselves, which limits their influence.
In the context of these different BRICS narratives, the upcoming Summit is very important. If we witness a new BRICS strategic decision (which was looming even before last year’s Summit in the Republic of South Africa, but was not adopted at the time) aimed at the de-dollarization of the global economy, the consequences will be felt throughout the world. And large ones at that. That’s why this meeting in Kazan can be one of the most significant in recent years in international relations as a whole. That is why it is eagerly awaited in Europe. Of course, everyone in Europe is eagerly awaiting it for their own reasons.
Announcements that BRICS is considering the establishment of an accounting currency, a reserve currency or a digital currency have been supplemented in recent weeks with the thesis of a new payment system, which would work in parallel with the system developed a long time ago by Western institutions (SWIFT). In fact, BRICS would thus demonopolize the world financial system and “push” the de-dollarization of the global economy. Undoubtedly, a lot has been done in the fields of de-monopolization and de-dollarization in previous years, since the establishment of the principle of payment in domestic currency during mutual foreign trade exchanges, but a new strategic decision would confirm everything that has been done so far, as well as speed up further processes in both fields.
For BRICS, time is a relative category; de-monopolization and de-dollarization are understood as long-term processes.
Of course, ongoing crises, complex regional relations in various parts of the world and sometimes disagreement within BRICS on these topics make it difficult to make new strategic decisions. It is necessary to look at all the pluses and minuses, assume how the decisions will affect international security and analyze what and how big the risks are. Looking from that point of view, it would probably not be too late for BRICS to make strategic decisions at the next summit or at one of the summits in the following years. If the risk is too great for one of the members or potential members to accelerate de-dollarization (due to the cooperation of those countries with the USA and the possession of a huge amount of dollars, which would lose part of their value after a new strategic decision) or if such decisions cause new crises in some regions (for example, in the Middle East), in Kazan some moves may only be announced and then realized in 2025 or 2026.
For BRICS, time is a relative category, de-monopolization and de-dollarization are understood as long-term processes. In contrast, ongoing crises require immediate resolution, otherwise they may escalate in unwanted directions and cause new disruptions in international relations. However, it should also be emphasized that for the USA time is an absolute category, it is in their interest to prevent de-monopolization and de-dollarization immediately, as this will become more and more difficult with the passage of time. Hence the presumed use (abuse) of ongoing crises and manipulation of relations with the BRICS members in order to thwart the adoption of strategic decisions. For the US, it may be in their interest to influence the escalation of certain crises (ongoing – such as the Middle East and Ukraine, or potential – such as the South China Sea) in order to “increase the price” of de-monopolization and de-dollarization for BRICS. This includes crisis escalations that determine global security dynamics and define the character of international relations, and on which BRICS members do not share the same views. By disrupting regional and/or global security, the US slows down the BRICS, and through the targeted actualization of certain geopolitical focal points, they can also affect the disruption of internal relations in the BRICS.
The BRICS must work imaginatively and act quickly, otherwise the G7 will have room to develop new offensive actions against the Group.
Expectations from the Summit are high in the non-Western part of the world, they are also high among some European commentators and politicians, but precisely because the expectations are high – there is also a high stake at pole. Because of this big role, it would be important for BRICS to make new strategic decisions. Not only for the sake of speeding up de-monopolization and de-dollarization. But also because of controlling ongoing and preventing the outbreak of new regional crises. Through strategic decisions, BRICS will force the USA to adopt a defensive strategy, to defend what can be defended, whether it is the IMF, the World Bank, NATO or the EU. Otherwise, space will be left for the G7 to devise new offensive activities against the BRICS. The advantage of observing the upcoming meeting in Kazan from Europe is that during the analysis, all three narratives can be considered and based on that, one can get a broader picture of the BRICS strategy, the US counter-strategy (or, more accurately written – the American deep state) and potential outcomes. The international order is changing, it is certainly an irreversible process. But the question is how peaceful will this change be and what consequences will it have on international security?