With the passing of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in the helicopter crash, there is no shortage of unknowns. To get out of the emotional shock, Tehran must act swiftly by choosing a successor who is shared by the establishment and liked by the masses
Raisi’s death comes at a sensitive moment for Iran, which is seeking to consolidate its geopolitical influence
The death of President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ebrahim Raisi (and Foreign Minister Hosein Amir Abdollahian) comes at a delicate moment for Iran, which, seeking to consolidate its geopolitical influence in the Middle East, is preparing a transition.
Before considering the political implications of Raisi’s death, it is necessary to focus on the dynamics of the events that took place on Sunday, May 19. Now, by the Iranian establishment’s own admission, it seems confirmed that the helicopter the president was flying in crashed due to a technical malfunction and unfavorable weather conditions. The incident revealed a breach in the security protocol. Western sanctions have greatly reduced Iran’s ability to purchase new aircraft or repair outdated ones, such as the Bell 212 used by government officials during an official visit to Azerbaijan.
Some of Iran’s brightest minds, such as Qassem Soleimani, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, and Mohammad Reza Zahedi, have passed away in recent years
We must not underestimate the image and political damage. The Islamic Republic, which has long sought to assume the status of a regional power and leader of the Axis of Resistance in anti-Israeli functions, is proving fragile and continues to lose the top figures necessary to implement its hegemonic projects. Over the past four years, General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force and architect of the Axis, has been assassinated by the Israeli secret services and the US Army; Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a physicist in charge of the nuclear program; Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a leading member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria. The disappearance of the most “brilliant” minds represents a serious vulnerability for the Islamic Republic, whose ability to replace men of the system and “nurture talent” in the scientific and military fields is severely limited by international isolation and the chronic socio-economic crisis that has plagued the country.
Given the delicate domestic and regional situation, the regime will manage the transition period with special care, which, following Mohammad Mokhber’s brief interim regency, will lead to the appointment of a successor after a popular vote at the end of June, as stipulated in Article 131 of the Constitution. Although it is premature to talk about presidential candidates at this point, the names of former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, current parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani have been floated in recent days. In any case, the list of names will be scrutinized by the Guardian Council of the Constitution – a twelve-member body, half of whom are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader – which will be able to exclude profiles deemed unsuitable for the presidential race. In this sense, it is likely that the Council will focus on compromise figures between moderate and more radical directions, in order to guarantee as much continuity as possible in Raisi’s work and avoid internal struggles that could undermine the stability of the republic.
The regime can also focus on a candidate with strong popular support. In this way, a pre-election event could provide an opportunity to give the competition a kind of popular legitimacy by strengthening the currently frayed relationship between state and society. Raisi, in fact, never enjoyed a broad consensus for a number of reasons: he was considered not very charismatic and was perceived as a man of the apparatus, he was always associated with the “special commission,” accused of trying and convicting thousands of political prisoners in the late 1980s. Raisi’s funeral represented not only a moment of reflection and national unity, but also an opportunity to bring together in Iran representatives of allied countries or strategic partners, including Russia, China, India, Iraq, Syria, and representatives of the Axis of Resistance, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
The new president is unlikely to make significant changes to Iran’s foreign policy
The election of a new president could (partially) change the balance of power within the apparatus and alter the relationship between the state and the popular electorate, but it is unlikely that the appointment of a representative, even belonging to the “moderate” wing, could lead to significant changes in Iran’s foreign policy. Firstly, the President of the Republic does not act autonomously, but participates in the decision-making process together with members of the Supreme National Security Council – the body responsible for security, intelligence, and defense – with the Revolutionary Guards and with the Supreme Leader. Secondly, the establishment of the Resistance Axis and support for Hamas’s Operation Al-Aqsa Flood are medium- and long-term political projects and therefore cannot be canceled or interrupted ex abrupto.
The last aspect to be analyzed concerns the issue of the succession of the Supreme Leader, given Ali Khamenei’s advanced age and his serious health condition. Raisi, known for his ironclad loyalty to the Ayatollah and complete sharing of his political views, was considered one of his favorites. His disappearance certainly complicates the transfer of the highest office in the state, but at this point it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify viable candidates. One of the names that is repeated most often is Mojtaba, Khamenei’s son, who, however, is not very popular. His appointment would be interpreted by the establishment as a primarily dynastic operation, a procedure alien to the functioning of the Islamic Republic and reminiscent of the monarchical past.
Therefore, to overcome the emotional shock caused by Raisi’s death, Tehran will have to act quickly to appoint a successor who is shared by the establishment and not disliked by the masses. Without adequate internal harmony, any quest for hegemony in the Middle East scenario risks remaining limited to an abstract level of rhetoric.