Middle Powers In The World Politics

This year’s International Forum in Astana (held in October) was dedicated to the place and position of middle powers in the changing international environment. The kind hosts, as always, organized everything at a very high level, and this time they arranged a separate lecture by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Even if the head of state does not say anything substantive and sticks to the usual political phrases, for the participants – mostly people from the academic community and the media – this would be a significant matter. It’s not every day you get the chance to ask the head of state something. And it is not every day that the head of state has the opportunity to answer honestly and extensively. President Tokayev did not stick to the usual political phrases; he spoke about essential matters. Undoubtedly, Kazakhs see themselves as a middle power. That is, a state of middle power. Why do they feel this, what is the basis for such an understanding?

President Tokayev emphasizes the four pillars of foreign policy: independence, multilateralism, regional stability, and diplomacy. Therefore, in order for a country to be counted among the middle powers, it has to lead an independent foreign policy (pragmatic and not backing any of the parties in conflicts), to actively support the work of multilateral platforms (be it international organizations or initiatives), to strive to bring together all regional actors (in Central Asia, the format of the so-called “five” works, which, in addition to Kazakhstan, also includes Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan), and to constantly undertake diplomatic actions that would indirectly or directly resolve open issues (with no reliance on military force and imposing a solution on anyone).

In a comprehensive annual review of domestic and global developments for 2023, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Research underlined that “middle powers are trying to maintain order” within the world political system at times of structural change. As a result, they clash with the big powers, because the middle powers demand that “the same rules and basic principles apply to everyone.” Since we live in an “era of disorder,” maintaining order is increasingly demanding, so, according to the previous conclusion, the relations between medium and great powers can be problematic. However, when talking about middle powers, there is also a previous problem that needs to be solved. What are middle powers anyway? How to define them?

What seems obvious in the political space is often completely unclear in the academic community and confusing for journalists. Basically, as many presenters spoke on this topic, they gave as many different definitions. Each one determines and classifies middle power according to some of their own criteria. Thus, depending on the authors, their theoretical and methodological frameworks – and depending on which country they come from – as a rule, one could hear how the middle powers are also India, Japan, Brazil, South Korea, Germany, but also Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Israel…

This term began to be used more intensively from the middle of the 20th century, when Canada and Australia sought a greater role in the UN, calling themselves middle powers. It is not known how Churchill and Stalin reacted to this request, although it can be easily assumed. Undoubtedly, some countries are more influential in the international environment or stand out due to certain indicators of power potential (military, economic, political), so it is not possible to classify them as small states, and at the same time, their influence and power potential are disproportionately lower compared to the “most significant players,” so it is not possible to classify them as great powers either. Several dozens of different and often incomparable actors of international relations appear in that intermediate space. Among them, for example, there are sub-imperial powers, regional actors who, thanks to the support of a great power (empire) at the global level, can satisfy part of their own interests at the regional level with the support of the same great power. This could explain the actions of Japan or Israel. Among them are the declared regional powers, the states that determine regional security dynamics thanks to the fact that they have, in addition to expressed power potentials (they are greater than their neighbors), also a unique geographical position. Turkey and Iran are included in that category. Among them are aspirants for great powers, states that have long since surpassed the regional level and greatly influence certain global processes, such as India and Brazil. The already mentioned Australia and Canada can hardly be included in any of the three mentioned categories, since they are an integral part of the Anglosphere and the Five Eyes alliance. Together with the USA, Great Britain, and New Zealand, they harmonize the security policy and participate in the implementation of strategic goals.

A special difficulty, after February 2022, is the attempt to determine the role of European states. Apart from France, even if it was noticeable only at the level of rhetoric and constant repetition of the phrase about strategic autonomy, the other European members of NATO have almost no room for maneuver or independent action. Including Germany. Can a country that did not react at all to the destruction of a key pipeline on which its energy security depended be called a middle power?

President Tokayev is quite right when he claims that “great powers are locked in mutual rivalries,” and therefore international institutions do not have the capacity to solve current crises. However, what remains very questionable is how realistic is his call to gather middle powers and organize a platform for discussion and finding a solution. In itself, the idea is noble, the initiative can be useful in many ways, but sub-imperial powers will participate in that platform as conductors of imperial interests (they will always “pull” to one side, they do not have an objective and impartial approach), regional powers will all be viewed through the prism of the regions in which they dominate (they do not need new principles that will threaten their current position), aspirants for great powers will (miss)use the situation to legitimize their ambitions.

In an anarchic international environment, order changes with the establishment of a new balance of power. The new balance of power is created by the great powers (with partners following them), and the order can be established either through confrontation or through cooperation. Most often, order is built through confrontation, there are rare cases when it was played out through cooperation, that is, by an agreement between great powers that create a balance of power. Such an exception was recorded at the end of the XX century, since the self-abolition of the Soviet superstate also disintegrated the bipolar order. However, everything did not go smoothly again, and in order to consolidate the new (im)balance of power and the unipolar order based on it, the USA waged a series of preventive and preemptive wars, carried out aggressions against other sovereign states, organized color revolutions, and disciplined partners.

The ongoing establishment of a new balance of power, which has gone too far and is already irreversible, results in the formation of a (most likely asymmetric) multipolar order, and the escalation of conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, unfortunately, can only represent the beginning of new conflicts that will continue on other meridians, where there are geopolitical hotspots. Can the middle powers prevent such a development of the situation? There is no precise answer, of course. Among other things, because the explanation of the concept of middle power is also questionable. But that is no reason not to think about this topic, or not to initiate new researches. Perhaps, precisely through the process of framing the platform for cooperation a clearer definition of the middle power can “emerge.” Maybe just like that, new ideas about establishing rules and principles of a new order will appear. In general, this approach should not be abandoned. Both because of the practical, political part, and because of the other, theoretical and academic part. If nothing else, this year’s International Forum in Astana showed that the topic still needs to be discussed. All conflicts end with agreements.

Sooner or later, when the establishment of the balance of power is completed and the order is “cemented,” it will be necessary to initiate discussions on numerous topics, agree on negotiating frameworks, and seek solutions through diplomacy. Certainly, it will be necessary for someone to play the role of a mediator, acceptable to all the great powers.

Small states cannot play such a role. Therefore, the middle powers remain. Despite everything and regardless of the fact that, at least for now, we cannot define them.