Serbia between the EU and BRICS

Stalin is long dead, but the application of his methodology in foreign policy is still alive today. In the conditions of major internal fractures, practically prolonged civil war that continued endlessly, with relatively smaller potentials of military and economic power than competitors in international relations and partially isolated on the world stage, at the end of the 1930s the Soviet Union nevertheless significantly expanded its influence in other European countries. Relying on informal structures (most often communist parties in other countries) and radical ideological discourses (directed towards a complete change of the internal arrangement) increased the number of supporters of the new political concept, thereby multiplying the number of channels for strengthening Soviet influence. Unlike his competitors, Stalin understood the scope of what we now call strategic culture. Through the use of strategic culture, the ideological narrative was first legitimized through informal structures, and then, where possible and to the extent possible, formal structures were “attacked” and “conquered”. Somewhere the communists took power, somewhere they represented a strong opposition.

The advantage of the collective West, which is facing major internal fractures, prolonged political confrontations that can turn into sharper social conflicts, whose military and economic power is continuously declining and whose interests are being pushed out of different world macro regions, is reflected in its strategic culture. What are Western values ​​- that is clear. What are the values ​​of other, non-Western actors in this context – most often it is not completely clear. By relying on informal structures (most often non-governmental organizations, media, political parties and numerous networked influential groups) and radical ideological discourses (postmodernist conceptualization of human rights and freedoms manifested by the actualization of gender equality issues), the USA and the EU continue to maintain influence. Somewhere this influence is stronger – so the formal structures are also under their control, somewhere it is weaker so alternatives to the ruling structures are established thanks to it, but the influence still exists thanks to the supporters of the new political concept. In European countries, the influence is stronger, so formal policies are also on the “transatlantic course”. Possibly the weakest point in the action of non-Western actors is related to basing their own strategies towards European states on formal ones. Russian support for the separation of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006 was received with disbelief in political and intellectual circles in Belgrade, as the accompanying explanations were related to how it would contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations between Moscow and Podgorica and the stabilization of conditions in the Balkans. Even then it became clear how the projected secession was taking place for the sake of entrenching NATO in the Balkans. Because, despite the formal announcements that came from Milo Djukanović – a key political leader in Montenegro and were addressed to Moscow, a different game was being played at the informal level. Even then, the majority of Serbs remained against joining NATO. Geopolitical engineering meant that, firstly, by secession of Montenegro, and then by the persistent work of informal structures, the environment was created for the formal inclusion of part of the former FR Yugoslavia into NATO. It is no less important that this is how Serbia became a landlocked continental country.

Similarly, the Chinese optimism associated with the realization of the 16 plus 1 concept in Central Eastern Europe was viewed with a great deal of skepticism in Belgrade. China treated everyone the same, as if all European countries were independent in making decisions. It simply went over the fact that most European countries are in vassal status. NATO serves this purpose, and the EU serves this purpose to a large extent. The latter walling off the Chinese and prolonging all the agreed projects from a whole series of European countries showed how quickly and easily opinions can be changed under American pressure. Again, informal structures did their job and influenced formal policy change.

This somewhat longer introduction is also necessary to explain the importance of perception. In the non-Western part of the world, Serbia is perceived as free and sovereign, an island in the NATO ocean, a country that has shown that it leads an independent policy and that does not succumb to pressure. In the western part of the world, Serbia is perceived as a weak state, an actor that cannot survive without the EU, which is relatively easy to destabilize and whose authorities are therefore susceptible to pressure. True, in that perception, Serbia is somewhat disobedient, but to some extent it is cooperative when faced with pressure. Due to such pressures, the activism of Western informal structures in Serbia is not at all problematic. In fact, the current government led by Aleksandar Vučić is problematizing the activities of pro-Western political parties, this is his opposition whose actions he tries to relativize in every act. However, when it comes to other informal structures, their influence even increased during his reign. Creating his Serbian Progressive Party as a “big tent”, he appointed extremely pro-Western oriented individuals to individual leadership positions, who not only maintained but also expanded the influence of the USA and the EU in the Serbian political system. Thus, Ana Brnabić, a completely marginal figure on the Serbian political scene, was given the opportunity to be elected prime minister three times and remained in that position for almost 7 years. By the way, after graduating from the little-known Northwood University in Michigan, Brnabić worked in the local USAID office in Serbia from 2002 and dealt with the issue of local self-government development. As a USAID staff member, she managed the establishment of the non-governmental organization National Alliance for Local Economic Development, so after her involvement in politics, this organization became a kind of center for writing various laws that were then adopted by the National Assembly. In the absence of other qualifications, Brnabić’s sexual orientation helped her progress. Appointing a homosexual woman to the head of the government should have shown how western values ​​are accepted. In this connection, the decision of the Serbian authorities to organize Europride 2022 in Belgrade is shameful. After several weeks of protests by hundreds of thousands of citizens, that event was canceled, but on the announced day after the visit of American Ambassador Christopher Hill to Aleksandar Vučić, it was somehow held. About a hundred LGBT activists from Europe and representatives of the diplomatic corps from Belgrade took a short walk through Tašmajdan Park, while they were secured by thousands of police officers. There was no classic Europride, but in the end the event was realized. Approximately, this is the best illustration of the situation on the Serbian political scene. In principle, Serbia has been fighting its battle over Kosovo for a quarter of a century and has not come to terms with the NATO project called the “Republic of Kosovo”, but at the same time, under the pressure of informal structures, the formal policy is gradually changing, concessions are being made and step by step legitimizes the status of the so-called “Republic of Kosovo” in international relations.

In principle, Serbia has not introduced sanctions against Russia, de facto it is the only one in Europe with such a policy, but at the same time, under the pressure of informal structures, the formal policy is gradually changing. It is striking that there are no new realized strategic projects with Russia since the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and since 2022 there has been no response to Russian invitations to organize bilateral meetings (invitations sent to the President of Serbia, the head of diplomacy and the Speaker of the National Assembly). In principle, next to Hungary, Serbia is the European country that cooperates most intensively with China, but at the same time, one short meeting of the President of Serbia with Donald Trump in 2020 was enough to practically suspend the already agreed project with the Chinese company Huawei on installing a 5G network in the country.

In parallel with that, it is also noticeable that the number of strategic projects in which only Western companies participate is multiplying by geometric progression. On the one hand, since the adoption of the new Strategic Concept of NATO in 2010, in which energy security was declared a key issue, Western actors have been intensively working to dislodge Russian influence from the Balkans. Planning and implementing strategic projects with the Russians, especially in the energy sector, has become difficult since then. From 2022, it is practically impossible. On the other hand, the arrival of the Chinese investors Hesteel in 2006 (they bought a steel mill in Smederevo) and Zijin in 2018 (they bought a copper mine and a smelter in Bor) and their takeover of two economic giants that were in a difficult situation (Western investors did not wanted to invest in them), alarmed the diplomats of the USA and European countries.

Now, Serbia’s gross domestic product depends to a large extent on Chinese productivity, which is unacceptable from the point of view of the collective West. The frequent visits of Western officials to Belgrade and the signing of a series of contracts and memoranda are strategically oriented and have to do with displacing Russian and limiting Chinese influence. The last in the series is the visit of Emmanuel Macron, during which the purchase of 12 French Rafale aircraft for the Serbian Armed Forces, worth 2.7 billion euros, was agreed. Although the most impressive, this deal is not the only one that has been agreed. Another 11 bilateral documents concerning energy, the green agenda, food security, critical raw materials and scientific cooperation were signed. Among them is the Letter of engagement for assessing the potential for the development of the civil nuclear program in Serbia. As in the case of the acquisition of new military aircraft, this is also the announcement of a possible major turnaround, since a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with the Russian Rosatom during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belgrade in 2019. Will the French also build a nuclear plant in Serbia? The Minister of Energy, also a completely marginal figure on the Serbian political scene, started her career as a CNN producer working in Afghanistan, and joined the Government of Serbia from the European Investment Bank, where she was in charge of implementing projects in the Balkans. Is there any doubt on whose side her sympathies are in this “nuclear race” in Serbia? By the way, in previous years, French investors already took over the management of the airport in Belgrade and started the construction of the subway in the capital of Serbia. Could a better offer have been obtained from some other creditors and investors if the process had been transparent?

While the Russians are nowhere in sight, and the Chinese are concentrated on industry (the last major Chinese investment is the opening of a factory for the production of car tires), large strategic projects worth several billion euros have been implemented in recent years in coordination with Western institutions. The last in the series is the Jadar project, which concerns the opening of a lithium mine in Western Serbia by Rio Tinto. Before Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Belgrade with the task of convincing Serbs that lithium exploitation is incredibly important. It turned out that it is important for Germany, since this critical raw material is lacking for producers in the EU, but how important it is for Serbia remains questionable. Because there is still no reliable data on what the consequences of lithium exploitation will be for the environment. It seems incredible, but a Rio Tinto company study on the subject was declared an official secret. The majority of scientists (among them researchers recognized in the world) claim that the consequences can be catastrophic, and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts made a statement about this by organizing a large scientific conference, which alarmed the public. The protests organized throughout Serbia influenced some non-Western media to start talking about a coup d’état and a color revolution. In such a setting, the question of the cause of the protest is undefined. The protests are directed against Rio Tinto and all those investment funds behind this company (including Black Rock)! Of course, neither the concerns of scientists nor the protests of citizens prevented Aleksandar Vučić from starting an active lobbying campaign for the exploitation of lithium. Will he succeed?

According to a public opinion survey conducted at the beginning of September (the survey was conducted by the New Serbian Political Thought), almost 60% of Serbian citizens are against the opening of the mine, while 25% are in favor of it (the rest are undecided). The view of the respondents on who will benefit the most from the eventual opening of the mine is very interesting: only 21.7% of the respondents said that that will be “citizens of Serbia”, while a total of almost three quarters believe that Rio Tinto will benefit the most (23.8 %), Germany (21.8%) and “current government” (18.5%). Finally, and when it comes to the always somewhat sensitive topic of protests, as many as 56.22% of citizens believe that the protests against Rio Tinto are justified, while 32.2% think they are not.

However, this is no guarantee that the Jadar project will be abandoned. First, if there was a research on the purchase of military aircraft, there would probably be a similar result on the question of whether to buy them from a NATO country? The fact that the majority of the public is against something does not mean that it will not happen.

Second, the fragmented opposition, especially the anti-Western one, does not manage to translate citizens’ dissatisfaction into a good election result. It’s no wonder, since that part of the Serbian opposition has neither access to the most important media, nor any external support, nor stable funding. The Serbian government and the West are working together against the anti-Western opposition, so its reach is also modest. The pro-Western opposition can count on a quarter or in the best case a third of the votes won in the elections, which is not enough to threaten the government. Simply, for a large part of the citizens, the pro-Western opposition is not an option because they no longer believe in the EU, and the topic of NATO should not even be mentioned in particular. That is why it seems that the EU and NATO are using the pro-Western opposition more in order to exert additional pressure on Vučić and direct his actions. They are there to help transform informal into formal politics.

The overwhelming majority of citizens, along with part of the intellectual and academic elite, and thanks to alternative media and social networks, share one attitude. According to relevant public opinion surveys, 88% of Serbian citizens are against joining NATO, only 40% are in favor of joining the EU (IRI survey), 71% consider Russia a friend, 64% are against the introduction of sanctions against Russia (a survey by the Institute for European Affairs, 21% are undecided on this issue), and as many as 75% of them consider China a friendly country (a survey by the Institute for European Affairs from December 2023). This mood of the citizens of Serbia is a special sociological phenomenon that will be researched in the coming decades. Claims by Western countries that this is a consequence of the work of the Russian media in Serbia seem ridiculous. Only two Russian Internet portals (Radio Sputnik and RT Balkans) operate in Serbia, with a limited reach and without permission to broadcast all-day radio or television programs. The number of Russian or Chinese non-governmental organizations, research institutes or some professional associations modeled on Western forms are – zero! This mood of citizens is not due to “malign Russian influence” or “chinfluence”, it has completely different causes.

However, the other part of the elite, facing the West and supported by informal structures, shares a diametrically opposite attitude. In practice, it turns out that this part of the elite, in spite of the opposition of the majority of citizens, exerts greater influence on the decisions of the authorities. Hence the implementation of strategic projects with Western actors.

Before concluding, it is necessary to write something in defense of Aleksandar Vučić. Serbia leads a multi-vector foreign policy. Even earlier (in the period 2006-2008), when Vojislav Koštunica was the prime minister, the so-called “balance of influence” policy was defined. Realizing that anything and everything passes under the form of European integration (Western strategic culture), and that the Western influence in Serbia (and with it Western values) is spreading in such a boundless way, Koštunica even at that time (and in that time of general intoxication with European integration throughout continent, such a move was not only visionary, but also represented great courage) institutionalized cooperation with non-Western actors. First of all, with Russia, which was sealed by the entry of Gazprom into the Serbian Oil Industry and the agreement on the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline. Serbia diversified its foreign policy and tried to balance the influence of external actors on its policy. In this way, excessive dependence on the USA and the EU was avoided (knowingly or unknowingly, most Eastern European countries became almost completely dependent on the USA and the EU during the process of European integration). Aleksandar Vučić did continue such a policy, he tried to maintain a high level of relations with Russia and China (also, he managed to raise relations with Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and to a certain extent with Iran, and there were also attempts to strengthen communication with India). Looking at the period of his twelve-year reign, he did manage to do that, especially when it comes to improving relations with China. However, circumstances have changed over the past twelve years. First gradually from 2014, and then rapidly from 2022.

Squeezed between the desire to expand cooperation with non-Western actors and increasingly strong attacks from the political West, he began to make compromises with the aim of cushioning pressure from the US and the EU. Those compromises first of all related to concessions regarding Kosovo, which included the acceptance of the legality of the institutions of the so-called Republic of Kosovo and the abolition of the institutions of the Republic of Serbia, which continued to function in Serbian areas in Kosovo until his rule. In the second phase, when concessions in Kosovo could no longer be used to cushion the pressure (now we have actually reached the last phase because the EU explicitly requires Serbia to allow the so-called Republic of Kosovo to join all international organizations), various arrangements with the Western actors. Hence Macron in Belgrade, and Olaf Scholz’s visit, after which active lobbying for Rio Tinto begins, but also the latest agreement on energy cooperation with the USA.

In principle, Serbia’s foreign policy is not changing, but fundamentally, Western influence in Serbia has begun to grow. Informal structures quickly became formal. Relying on the strategic culture the USA and the EU sometimes even forced proclaimed values ​​into Serbian political life. Another part of the ruling structures (for example, the Vice-President of the Government of Serbia, Aleksandar Vulin, who is in charge of cooperation with BRICS, or the Minister of the Interior, Ivica Dačić, who is considered to be close to Moscow) advertised in public, tried to show by their actions that nothing is changing in Serbian politics, but the scope of this approach is very modest. That is why the question arose: is Serbia changing its foreign policy? Aleksandar Vučić is aware of the mood of the public and he knows very well that any big turn in foreign policy would cost him the probable loss of power. That’s why he makes sure that sovereignists and supporters of cooperation with Russia and China are always represented in the government. That is why he maintains relations with Moscow and Beijing, and welcomes Xi Jinping in Belgrade in a special way. However, he is very well aware of the influence of informal structures and the damage that the USA and the EU can do to him if he starts a “frontal war” with them. In the West, both among the American democrats and among the liberals and greens in the EU, there is no shortage of politicians who are very annoyed that Serbia is even somewhat disobedient and who would therefore like to replace Vučić by intensifying the pressure and destabilizing Serbia. Those people are convinced that after Vučić, only a pro-Western structure, fully cooperative with Washington and Brussels, can come to power. Faced with those threats, Vučić is using arrangements with Macron, Scholz, Rio Tinto, Black Rock and others from the West to pay the price for maintaining principled policy and buying time. Is that the right way? Is it really possible to preserve principled policy in this way? What is time bought for? There are many questions, but there are no precise answers. Uncertainty in European politics is great, and the unpredictability of the further course of international relations is absolute.

Vladimir Putin’s invitation for Aleksandar Vučić to attend the upcoming BRICS Summit in Kazan should also be viewed in this context. The perception of Serbian foreign policy seems to be changing in the non-Western part of the world as well, regardless of the fact that, in principle, that policy remains the same. The devil is in the details, and those details indicate that Western influence in Serbia is getting stronger. Although it will never become a member of the EU (this is now quite certain, since the EU included the de facto recognition of the so-called Republic of Kosovo in the negotiation Chapter 35), although the EU is in the biggest crisis since its foundation, Serbia today cooperates with key EU members through strategic projects more and deeper than ever in its history. Putin needs to clarify some things. The invitation to participate in the BRICS Summit is spectacular in every aspect and was well received by the Serbian public.

Although this is not an invitation for Serbia to become a member of BRICS, due to the circumstances it is not even realistic at the moment, even the indirect involvement in the work of this format is very significant for a small European country. But, fearing the reaction of the USA and the EU and the activation of all informal structures in Belgrade, Vučić essentially refused him on the first day, saying that he would have many foreign guests in Belgrade in the middle of October. Due to the stormy reaction of the public, he softened his initial statement the next day, stressing that the decision has not yet been made, as he has a busy schedule of meetings. Between the pluses that a trip to Kazan brings and the minuses that that trip can create in Belgrade, it seems that the latter prevails in the current assessment. And why wouldn’t the later be more significant? On whom can Russia and China count on in Belgrade but Vučić?

Neither Moscow nor Beijing have any informal structures capable of exerting pressure on the Serbian authorities. In contrast to the USA and the EU, which have been working on this plan for three decades. As a result, in principle, Serbian foreign policy remains the same. With the hope that the perception of Serbia will remain the same among non-Western actors and that it will be clarified why it is yielding to the West and what this yielding is for. At the same time, Western influence in Serbia is growing, which is reflected in greater dependence on the USA and the EU. The established balance of influence is slowly being disturbed. Which is probably some kind of guarantee that the perception of Serbia in the West will remain the same, unfavorable for Serbia itself, but also sufficient for cooperation to continue in this rhythm and for there to be no major attempts at destabilization.

Serbia should leave the door open for cooperation with BRICS – aware of the role of this platform in the future, and not close the door to the EU – aware of the consequences it may cause in the present. Can this work? The answer depends on future developments in European politics and the further course of international relations. The room for maneuver for conducting such a policy is becoming narrower.