Why President Pezeshkian’s Election is Good News

The presidential election held in Iran in June represented a moment of great importance for the Middle Eastern country for three reasons: timing, domestic, and international significance. The Islamic Republic had to organize an election campaign in record time after the sudden death of incumbent President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has already assured the country that Iran will not enter a chaotic transition phase, but that the transfer of power to the new chief executive will be characterized by stability and continuity. Last month’s elections thus required the Iranian establishment to demonstrate stability despite the abrupt transition.

Another reason that made the June 28 election important was voter turnout. The Islamic Republic has been experiencing a sharply negative and steadily declining trend in the number of voters for many years. Former President Raisi himself was elected in 2021 with only 17.9 million votes out of an estimated 60 million eligible voters, with an overall turnout of 49%. The social contract within the republic seems to be increasingly deteriorating, and this can be seen both in the low response to the electoral appeal (this applies not only to the president of the republic, but also to members of parliament) and in the popular protests that have occurred sporadically but continuously in various parts of the country since 2017.

Iranian society, in its various cultural, ethnic, social, and workplace manifestations, is increasingly critical of a political system that is struggling to renew itself, where the space for political debate has shrunk considerably since the contested re-election of President Ahmadinejad in 2009 and where the control of individual freedoms has become increasingly aggressive. Thus, the June elections raised a big question for the Iranian elite, which has always tried to present the electoral moment as a guarantee of the political system’s stability. On the other hand, the Iranian population appears increasingly disinterested in the mechanisms governing the functioning of the republic, primarily due to the lack of confidence in structural and substantive change and an apparent shrinking space for political debate, which has particularly affected reformist policies.

In fact, only 39% of voters participated in the June election, the lowest ever recorded in the history of republican Iran. It is interesting to note that among the six candidates allowed to run, there was only one member of the clergy and only one centrist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian. The rest were well-known names in the establishment, belonging to a cadre of conservative technocrats, such as Mohammad Qalibaf (always defeated in presidential elections) and Saeed Jalili, an extremist and former head of the international negotiating team for the nuclear program. Pezeshkian and Jalili went to a runoff on July 5, with the former winning with 53.7% of the vote and about 15 million votes. Voter turnout also increased by 10% compared to the first round, indicating the newly elected president’s ability to mobilize some of the presumably young electorate.

Although for the first time since 2005 we are again seeing a president who belongs to the reformist front, Pezeshkian’s victory should not be taken with much enthusiasm. In fact, it means defeat for other candidates, distrust in the electoral system and in the ability to change the authoritarian deviations that the Iranian system has accumulated over the years. The election also showed the deep divide that has permeated the conservative galaxy for years. It was because of internal divisions between the pragmatists, extremists, military technocrats, and the more moderate traditionalist wing that Pezeshkian managed to win, and it was only during the second round that some voters absent from the first round decided to go to the polls.

Former health minister during Khatami’s second presidency (2001-2005), Pezeshkian is a predominantly centrist representative close to and supported by reformist circles during the election campaign. His victory does not signify an attempt by the system to introduce substantial reforms or to continue the structural changes followed by the reformist front in the 1990s. At this stage, Pezeshkian plays the role of interlocutor with society, even without the tools to correct the social pact. In fact, he is a figure far removed from the big names and leading establishment figures who have long since lost popular support. Nevertheless, his ability to enact substantial reforms appears partially constrained. On the one hand, the functioning of the republic provides for decentralization of power and overlapping decision-making bodies. The executive power does not have full autonomy, but its actions are constantly debated and balanced by other institutions. On the other hand, there is an image, both internal and external, which the republic must preserve and which the new president will have to work on.

Pezeshkian has positioned himself as a moderate figure, which at this stage is beneficial to Iran both in terms of domestic balance and in presenting the country abroad. Domestically, the election of a conservative and extremist candidate like Jalili would further increase popular discontent, leading to new and possibly more recurring protests. In foreign policy, it would exacerbate or even derail the slow nuclear negotiations with Europe. In international context, characterized by the conflict between the West and Russia and the ongoing war in Gaza, the presence of a president like Jalili would put Iran in an even more unstable position. Pezeshkian, on the other hand, included in his campaign topics dear to the young and reformist electorate, but also positive for a renewed diplomatic debate with the West: social liberalization and an attempt at dialogue with the West to lift economic sanctions. From the domestic standpoint, reducing control over individuals is useful for reassuring people and alleviating widespread discontent in Iranian society, which may reappear from time to time. As to foreign policy, Pezeshkian has put himself in a position to reopen the international debate. This is certainly good news for Iran and its economic system, but also for the counterparty involved. Dialogue with Iran, in fact, has always strengthened the reformist and pragmatic components within the republic and, above all, prevented nuclear proliferation. This necessity becomes even more urgent in light of the upcoming US presidential election, which, with the possible return of Donald Trump to presidency, will once again plunge Iran into “maximum pressure.”

Iran’s foreign policy does not depend solely on the president and his foreign minister. The Supreme Leader, the Armed Forces, and the Supreme National Security Council also contribute to defining the foreign policy strategy of the republic. This means that despite the change in executive power, there is a foreign policy that addresses national interests beyond individual presidents and ministers. Thus, we should expect a certain degree of continuity with respect to previous foreign policy and, in particular, with respect to military support for Russia with drones and missiles, support for Shiite militias in the region, commercial and strategic alliance with China, and the continuation of the “Look East” policy. The de-escalation process with Arab neighbors is also expected to continue, as rapprochement with Saudi Arabia began more than a year ago under Beijing’s mediation. A centrist president may favor certain dynamics, such as diplomatic détente with the EU in the context of nuclear negotiations and dialogue with Riyadh. It is important, however, that the president is supported by military groups affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards operating in the region, whose actions often contradict the foreign policy line expressed by the executive power.

Ultimately, Pezeshkian’s election is positive news both for the West, which is intent on integrating Iran into the international context, and for the Islamic Republic’s internal stability. His limited room for maneuver should not lead to the belief that the president lacks decision-making ability, but rather should make us think about trying to find lines of understanding and be able to develop a clear foreign policy strategy with all the forces involved. Pezeshkian must demonstrate that he can reduce invasive control over society and promote respect for human rights, even despite expectations facing numerous internal obstacles resulting from the Iranian Republic’s complex composition and functioning.