Burma, Disputed Treasure Chest

In northern Indochina, Myanmar is a peculiar political, structured by the dominant Burmese ethnic group, which since the 11th century began a long struggle to assimilate indigenous minorities. They make up 30% of Burma’s population and occupy half of the territory, especially the mountainous border areas (1). Upper Burma, formed by the Irrawaddy valley, “faces entirely to the rich alluvial plains that occupy its center. Protected from the summer monsoon winds by the high Arakan Range, it has a special climate. Here Burmese kings founded their successive capitals, here they received tribute from neighboring populations and mountain peoples. Lower Burma, on the other hand, does not form a coherent whole. The natural insularity of this region is reinforced by a particularly pronounced monsoon climate, which during the rainy season complicates all communications” (2). This fundamental difference between upper and lower Burma has not prevented Myanmar from seeking to maintain its neutrality. Historically, it has been groomed by antagonistic powers, but is now approaching Chinese geopolitical might. Contacts between Western maritime powers have a long history. For example, there is a survived letter written on May 7, 1756 by the Burmese King Alaungmintaya to the British sovereign George II. This letter was inscribed on a gold plate adorned with twenty-four rubies (3). In the 19th century, the Konbaung dynasty fell under the British East India Company after three Anglo-Burmese wars and was incorporated under British rule before becoming a separate British colony in 1937. For example, George Orwell was a policeman in 19th century British Empire in Burma (4).

However, Britain made the mistake of turning Burma into a mere annexation of the Indian Empire. And “the stationing of Indian troops, the introduction of abundant Indian labor force, the creation of a heavy military debt in favor of India, and the sanctification of the rights of Indian landowners not just aggravated the original error. Thus arose Burmese separatism, which triumphed in 1935 with the passage of the Government of Burma Act. Out of separatism was born nationalism, which gradually worked its way up and, supported by the Japanese occupation, became powerful enough to demand and obtain the country’s independence on October 17, 1947” (5). Despite the break with Britain, ties continued. Thus, activist Aung San Suu Kyi took a philosophy course at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford, from 1964 to 1968. On the part of the continental powers, contacts with Burma have also been proven. Under the Ming dynasty, “the small principalities of upper Burma came more or less directly under Chinese rule. The emperor reserved the right to appoint their chiefs” (6). For its part, Russia established some contacts with Burma in the second half of the 19th century. Pachino traveled throughout Burma and maintained friendships with Burmese officials and common people alike. He states: “I don’t know where or from when most of the peoples of Asia developed the belief that they would be liberated by Russia from foreign hegemony.” King Mindon, a supporter of this viewpoint, translated the History of Peter the Great and learned it thoroughly because he wanted to become the second Peter the Great by all means. This fact is evidenced by a letter from the scientist Mendeleev to Grand Duke Nicholas, which reports the death of Mindon. In the late 1870s, the center of gravity of the Burmese-Russian negotiations shifted to Paris, and it was Mendeleev who tried to bring them to a conclusion. The Indologist Ivan Pavlovich Minaev (1840-1890) visited Burma soon after its conquest by the British. On January 24, 1886, he noted in his Notebooks that “the Burmese praised the French and Russians and at the same time hated the British” (7). However, the Tsarist government, already struggling with British influence in Tibet and Afghanistan, was very little concerned about deteriorating relations with England for such a distant and inaccessible country.

After World War II, Burma tried to maintain its neutrality. Geographer Rottier writes: “Having believed after the experience of the last world war in the superiority of neutrality, it has since birth accepted this principle, which looks salutary to it, and intends to maintain it. By refusing to take sides with the two major blocs seeking to divide the world’s clientele, it is forced to give assurances to both, even though it believes it is simply providing proof of its good will. Having maintained close relations with Britain since its independence and then accepted American aid, it felt obliged to flirt with China, still limited on a cultural level, and to declare to the USSR that it would gladly welcome any economic assistance the latter might offer” (8). This distinguishes Burma from Thailand, which is better integrated into global maritime trade (9). If we look at the current geopolitical map of Asia, we see that the powers that support American policies (marked in blue) are mostly located east of China, be it Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, or Indonesia. And vice versa, a long line of neutral countries (in green) protects China’s southwestern border. Displacing a neutral country would have immediate consequences in the form of a threat to the Middle Kingdom. In Burma, the junta that came to power in 1962 continued to consolidate control over all institutions. The USA has imposed progressive financial sanctions against the country. Sanctions peaked during the presidency of George W. Bush when three executive orders were issued. However, in August 2003, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s initiative proposing a “roadmap to democracy” gave a glimpse of the possibility for a gradual democratic transition (10). In 2009, the United States recognized the ineffectiveness of its own sanctions and shifted to a more pragmatic policy of bending Burma to weaken China. It was within this framework that Barack Obama’s November 2012 visit took place. However, this new policy did not produce the expected results, leading to the renewal of sanctions a decade later. The regime, which is under US and EU sanctions, has now turned to Russia for arms and oil supplies. An agreement on cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy was also signed. It wants investments by Russian companies to offset the withdrawal of Western companies from the oil and chemical industries. The Burmese army also benefits from Beijing’s overt support. It must be said that Myanmar represents a strategic exporter of rare metals to China. As a member of the Belt and Road Initiative, Burma is currently crossed by oil and gas pipelines aimed at reducing China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca. The stakes are high for China: direct access to the Indian Ocean. There is a chronic confrontation between the national party backed by the army (the Union Solidarity and Development Party, USDP) and the libertarian party backed from abroad by social media (the National League for Democracy, NLD). The 2015 and 2020 elections gave the NLD a majority, but suspicions of fraud forced the military to take back power by declaring a state of emergency. The repression began on February 19, 2021. From that date, the country practically entered a civil war. Sanctions were imposed by the United States and the European Union against the Burmese regime. The latter, if largely bypassed, resulted in significant unemployment in the textile mills and damage to the interests of the Total group. Interestingly, sanctions against senior Burmese figures are systematically initiated by the United States, then cascaded by its Anglo-Saxon allies, and finally by the European Union countries. Mya Tun Oo, the current Minister of Defense, represents a good example. He was sanctioned on February 11, 2021 by the US Treasury Department, on February 18 by Canada and the United Kingdom, and finally on March 22, 2021 by the Council of the European Union (11). More generally, sanctions destabilize the state structured by the Burmese majority, which forms the central group, and the minorities to the east and west of the latter, respectively.

(1) Pierre Fistié, “La Birmanie ou la quête de l’unité. Le problème de la cohésion nationale dans la Birmanie contemporaine et sa perspective historique”, Revue française de science politique, 37 e année, n°1, 1987, p. 107-108.

(2) A. Rottier, “La Birmanie nouvelle”, Politique étrangère, n°2-3 – 1953 – 18 e année, p. 133-148.

(3) Jacques Leider, “La lettre du roi birman Alaungmintaya au roi de Grande-Bretagne George II (7 mai 1756) : la re- découverte du manuscrit en or et son contexte historique”, Comptes-rendus des séances de l’année -Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 155 e année, N. 1, 2011, p. 153-166.

(4) “Une histoire birmane, son premier roman, se déroule dans un lieu très isolé aux confins de la Haute-Birmanie”. Jean-Michel Wissmer, “Sur les pas de George Orwell en Birmanie”, Le Globe. Revue genevoise de géographie, tome 160, 2020, p. 55-68.

(5) A. Rottier, “La Birmanie nouvelle”, Politique étrangère, n°2-3 – 1953 – 18 e année, p. 133-148.

(6) Edouard Huber, “Une ambassade chinoise en Birmanie en 1406”, Bulletin de l’École française d’Extrême- Orient, Tome 4, 1904, p. 429-432.

(7) Jean Perrin, “Les relations entre la Birmanie et la Russie au XIX e siècle”, Bulletin de l’École française D’Extrême-Orient, Tome 49 N°2, 1959, p. 675-678.

(8) A. Rottier, “La Birmanie nouvelle”, Politique étrangère, n°2-3 – 1953 – 18 e année, p. 133-148.

(9) Louise Marcotte, “Birmanie-Thaïlande : un écart croissant”, Mappemonde, 1991, p. 2-3

(10) Renaud Egreteau, “Birmanie, l’armée referme le jeu politique” , Les études du CERI, N°114, mars 2005.

(11) Les sanctions européennes à l’encontre de la Birmanie se renforcent actuellement. Dans son règlement d’exécution du 26 avril 2024, le conseil de l’Union Européenne vise dix-neuf militaires dotés de fonctions politiques.