Failure in Kursk, Front in Donbass

An article by: Gianandrea Gaiani

After the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive, Ukrainian forces continue to defend themselves even after the August invasion of Russian territory. Conflict dynamics undermine Kiev's confidence and consensus around Zelensky

Recent developments in the conflict in Ukraine seem to be defining some of the differences between Ukraine and Western powers. The most obvious crisis on the front that wants to be seen as united has emerged in the heated and sometimes surreal debate surrounding Kiev’s demand to be able to use longer-range weapons supplied by major Western partners to strike Russian territory.

In particular, these include American ATACMS ballistic missiles used from M142 and M270 fielded missile launchers with a range of 300 kilometers, as well as Anglo-French Storm Shadow/SCALP EG cruise missiles launched from Ukrainian Sukhoi Su-24M aircraft with a range limited to 250 kilometers. The weapons have already been used extensively against targets in Crimea and occupied Ukrainian territories with some success, as well as with many bombs shot down by the Russians.

Many European NATO countries allowed Kiev to strike Russia with weapons they donated, but this was only a symbolic green light, as the weapons supplied by these countries do not have a significant range. President Vladimir Zelensky dispelled any misunderstandings on September 4, saying: “We need authorization to use long-range weapons from the countries that supply them to us. It’s up to them, not a coalition of all the friendly countries in the world. It’s up to the USA, the UK, France, Germany.

Italy is not on the list and has never specified whether it sent Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine, as stated in May by then UK Defense Secretary Grant Shapps. However, the Italian government has made it clear several times that it will not allow the weapons presented to Kiev to be used on Russian soil. Zelensky then referred to Germany, as he has been pressuring Berlin for months to deliver large numbers of Taurus cruise missiles (“relatives” of Storm Shadow). But Chancellor Olaf Scholz has always denied this request, explaining that sending these weapons would inevitably require sending German military technicians to Ukraine’s Starokonstantinov airport in the western Khmelnytsky region, housing Su-24M aircraft that have been repeatedly targeted by Russian missiles, which have destroyed or shot down a significant number of Ukrainian planes. The base, which housed Soviet bombers in the 1950s, has armored aircraft shelters and also appears to have been chosen to house five F-16s in service with the Ukrainian Air Force (the sixth aircraft was lost during the battle for reasons never made clear).

Ukrainian and Russian military bloggers, but no official sources at this time, have reported that on September 26 and 27, two bombardments with hypersonic Kinzhal missiles allowed the Russians to destroy or damage two or four F-16s and one Su-24M, as well as to blow up a warehouse with 15 Storm Shadow missiles and kill 9 foreign technicians (6 Americans and 3 French), injuring 13 others (7 British and 6 Dutch). Figures that are not verifiable by neutral sources, but which point to Kiev’s difficulties in maintaining the combat readiness of its air force, as well as allies’ difficulties in protecting their personnel in Ukraine from the systematic manhunt conducted by the Russians with the bombing of all Ukrainian targets with Kinzhal and Iskander missiles, where Moscow’s intelligence detects the presence of military advisers and trainers from NATO member states. Always a silent but necessary presence, allowing the Ukrainians to use Western weapons, vehicles, aircraft, tools, and military technology.

As early as mid-September, top military leaders in Washington buried Ukraine’s hopes of getting the green light to use Western weapons to launch a deep strike against Russia. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby acknowledged on September 4 that Russia had put 90% of its planes used to attack Ukraine outside the 300-kilometer radius of the Ukrainian border reachable by ATACMS missiles: “The argument that somehow, if you just give them an ATACMS and tell them ‘it’s okay’ that they’re going to be able to go in and hit the majority of the Russian aircraft and air bases that are, in fact, used to strike them is not true; it’s a misconception.

On September 6, Defense Minister Lloyd Austin said that lifting arms restrictions on Ukraine “would not change” the outcome of the war, stressing that there are no “game-changer” weapons and confirming that Russia has taken its glider-bombs beyond the range of ATACMS missiles, while Ukraine itself has the capability to attack targets at longer ranges. This is about the new drones manufactured by Kiev, which on September 18 and 21 struck large ammunition and missile depots in Toropets and Oktyabrsky in the Tver region (400 kilometers northwest of Moscow) and in Tikhoretsk in the Krasnodar region. The attacks, which Kiev believes have caused serious damage but so far have not reduced the amount of fire the Russians use every day to support an offensive or deep strikes in Ukraine. On September 6, Zelensky himself seemed to note that “the long-range weapons they provided to us cover 200 to 300 kilometers, so they are not capable of reaching the distances we would like.

It should also be added that several military sources, both in the USA and the UK, have told the media that the number of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles still in storage is too limited to be transferred to Ukraine.

Nevertheless, the debate over the use of Western weapons continues, leading Moscow to say that a possible green light in Kiev would be interpreted as an act of belligerence on the part of the suppliers of such weapons to Kiev. This assessment, combined with a brief review of Russian nuclear doctrine, seems to be in line with the real motives driving Ukraine’s pressure on its allies. Unless Storm Shadow and ATACMS change the rules of the game, their use against Russia would represent a risky and futile step toward direct involvement of Western powers in the conflict. A prospect the United States is determined to avoid weeks before the presidential election and during a campaign in which Ukraine represents one of many issues at odds between Harris and Trump. While in Kiev, the horrific course of the war on the Kursk and Donbass fronts (in addition to the devastation of 70 percent of the national power grid) is contributing to the growing realization that only direct Western intervention in the war will avoid defeat.

Moreover, two months after it began, the Ukrainian offensive in Russia’s Kursk region seems more in line with the Biden administration’s needs than Ukrainian defense priorities. It is no coincidence that in recent weeks there have been reports of an Anglo-American role in satellite and intelligence support (therefore having to do with planning) for an attack on Russian territory that also involved many “foreign fighters.”

Of course, Ukraine’s attack took the Russians by surprise and dealt a symbolic and reputational blow to the Kremlin, given that no strip of Russian territory has been occupied since World War II. While at the military level some analysts have compared the attack to the German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, at the political level the Kursk attack was intended to buy time for the Ukrainians by delaying defeat for a few weeks until after the US presidential election with widespread media coverage, such as the fall of the Donbass strongholds.

The Ukrainian fiasco in Donetsk and Luhansk on the eve of the US election is certain to be exploited by Donald Trump, who has long attacked the Biden administration and suggested a negotiated solution to the conflict. However, the attempt to force Moscow to suspend the offensive in Donbass to defend the national territory has completely failed. The Ukrainians have captured only one-thirtieth of the area of Kursk Region, and a Russian counteroffensive advancing on the enemy’s flanks threatens to cut off the Ukrainians’ supply lines. Casualties are also getting higher, given the greater firepower of Russian artillery and aircraft, as well as the lack of fortifications like those the Ukrainians can count on in Donbass. Russia seems in no hurry to end the game in Kursk, where the Ukrainians are sacrificing the best brigades they have left, which would instead be needed to halt the offensive in Donbass, where the Russians have broken the front at several points. At the time of writing, Moscow’s troops had surrounded Ugledar, penetrated Toretsk and Chasov Yar, and reached the suburbs of Kupyansk and Pokrovsk.

Ukrainian commanders told the Financial Times that the conscripts (often forcibly recruited) lack basic training and motivation, that most of them do not even know how to hold a gun properly, that 50 to 70 percent are killed or wounded in their first days at the front, and that most of them panic at the first bombardment. The average age of a Ukrainian soldier today is 45 – too old for an infantryman. Some officers say that in a platoon of 30 soldiers, on average, only five are under the age of 30.

Historical and strategic analyst

Gianandrea Gaiani