Georgia, the West, and “Russian Law”

Western media rarely cover the Caucasus, but Georgia has attracted a lot of attention recently, especially with the final passage in May of the so-called “Russian law,” which is often interpreted simplistically. The essence of this law is to consider entities that receive funding exceeding 20% from abroad as “foreign agents,” thus trying to control and limit their activities. In fact, there are noticeable similarities to the law passed in Russia back in 2012, but to interpret it as proof of Moscow’s influence on Georgia looks decidedly unconvincing to those familiar with the history and culture of that country. The vast majority of Georgia’s population actually has a negative view of Russia because of both the Tsarist conquest in the 19th century and the Soviet “reconquista” of the 20th century.

This attitude, in a sense excessive if we take a balanced view of the historical relations between Russia and Georgia, after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 determined a clear desire to leave Moscow’s orbit and move closer to the West. A position that has not changed significantly to date, with strong continuity from one government to the next. However, the party that has ruled the country since 2012 – Georgian Dream, founded and led by businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili – has a less extremist attitude toward Russia than the one that prompted President Mikheil Saakashvili to provoke the outbreak of a brief war in August 2008. The outcome of the conflict was extremely negative for Georgia, with the loss of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence was recognized by Moscow. Since then, the country’s political life has been dominated by the confrontation between the Georgian Dream and the United National Movement party, founded by former President Saakashvili in 2001.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Tbilisi expressed solidarity with Ukraine but imposed limited sanctions against Moscow to avoid jeopardizing the country’s economy, which is closely linked to Russia’s. Russia’s relations with Georgia have improved in recent years, especially in the economic sphere, particularly in tourism, but the country’s pro-European orientation has never been questioned. In 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Georgia expressed solidarity with Kiev but avoided intervening in the conflict and did not join sanctions against Russia. This position of Tbilisi was sharply criticized by Kiev, which recalled its ambassador. Nevertheless, Georgia’s pro-Western orientation did not disappear, and the government applied for membership in the European Union in March 2022, receiving candidate country status at the end of 2023.

The permanence of this orientation actually requires the study of the so-called “Russian law” not so much in relation to Moscow, but primarily in the political, social, and cultural context of Georgia itself. According to current Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, this law is aimed at countering “extremist organizations that receive Western orders and promote LGBT propaganda.” In fact, this is an effective communication strategy, as many Georgians have a conservative orientation, particularly due to the strong influence of the Orthodox Church, which enjoys great authority in the country. It is no coincidence that on April 26, the Patriarchate issued a statement supporting the passage of the law and instead criticizing the European Parliament’s resolution calling on Georgia to “withdraw the proposal restricting LGBT rights.” For the Orthodox Church, this “represents pressure on values recognized by the majority of the population” and implies a lack of “full recognition of Georgia’s sovereignty.”

Any way you judge it, statements like this make it clear that the “Russian law” actually has strong local overtones. In other words, there is widespread intolerance among the Georgian population to certain prescriptions coming from Brussels, but this does not jeopardize the country’s European orientation.

However, the conflict around this law, as it usually happens in Georgia, takes very hot tones. In addition to the large protest demonstrations taking place in the country, the conflict has become very deep at the political level, with an institutional conflict between the head of state and the government. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili, born in France to a family that emigrated during the Soviet era, is in fact strongly opposed to the “Russian law” and cast her veto, which was later overridden by a vote in parliament, in which the Georgian Dream has an overwhelming majority.

Moreover, both Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze have recently mentioned the existence of a Global War Party that would try to push the country into war against Russia using demonstrations protesting the new law. According to Georgian Dream supporters, the goal is to weaken the government, which defends “a united and strong Georgia that will take its rightful place in the common European family with its sovereignty, dignity, and values.” These words clearly demonstrate that for the current government, Europe remains Georgia’s political horizon without giving up its national specificity. At the same time, however, the accusation of external interference attributed not to Russia, but, albeit vaguely defined, to Western players and their “agents” in Georgia, is withdrawn.

As we can see, the issue of “Russian law” is much more complicated than it may seem at first glance. However, Georgia’s political dynamics, both domestic and international, are destined to become clearer in the coming months. The parliamentary elections to be held in October 2024 will be crucial in determining Georgia’s future political landscape and its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as the future of the Georgian Dream as the ruling party.