Iran: Progressive Turn? Yes, Certainly. Or Rather, Maybe

An article by: Alberto Bradanini

The election of a secular president aroused the enthusiasm of much of Persian society. And in Western capitals, Pezeshkian is looked upon with ill-concealed interest. But there is no certainty that the newly elected president will be able to counteract the orientation of real power still in the hands of the ayatollahs

The Iranian election victory of moderate Massoud Pezeshkian, a surgeon and health minister in Khatami’s reformist government, was greeted with a note of hope by most Western media, masters of their two preferred approaches: subjugation and superficial analysis. To soften the foregoing, it must be said that enforcing the principle of heterogenesis of purpose might even justify this hope, always taking into account that the dominant narrative is a direct daughter of the propaganda machine. According to the prevailing hermeneutic, the Pezeshkian victory – unexpected by Western experts/observers who, with the exception of a few semi-exiled hermits, echo the host’s voice in unison – could shed light on the country’s future. According to this interpretation, by voting for the moderates, the Iranian people expressed their willingness to reconcile themselves to the demands of the Great Satan (as the Iranian regime calls the USA), who in the Middle East, contrary to their own interests, is subservient to the interests of the Zionists, whose powerful lobbies control the media, senators/congressmen, and White House candidates (1). In light of this hypothetical appeasement between Iran and the USA, the Iranian people would see their living conditions improve, less repression, and greater respect for the rights of men and women. However, Iran is used to deny stereotypical practices and interpretations.

Let’s get things straight. According to the government, voter participation was less than 50%. Even under the hypothesis – hardly a winning bet – that this figure is correct, the fact remains that the majority of the population did not participate in the elections, considering them a regime’s trick. The Iranian leadership has a habit of choosing leaders, including the president, based on assessments that ignore the will of the people. Therefore, many believe that Pezeshkian’s victory should be seen as a selection rather than an election. And the techniques the regime has at its disposal are numerous: excluding inconvenient competitors, stifling propaganda, handing out privileges and promises, and, if that is not enough, falsification. If we exclude the nearly 20% who derive material and power benefits from this structure, a significant portion of the population has for some time been inoculated against the aforementioned rituals (wounds are still bleeding, being inflicted at the turn of the century by the disappointments of the Khatami Presidency, weakened or threatened, in any case unable to keep its promises), focused on a few priorities: jobs, purchasing power, social services, a little political viability, repressive moderation.

In Iran, the pyramid of power is at the top of the Supreme Leader (the elderly Ali Khamenei), a representative of the politicized Shiite clergy, surrounded by a secular arm, the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran). Successive presidents are controlled from above and are given limited prerogatives, as is Parliament (Majlis), whose regulations/laws must get the green light from the Guardian Council (appointed by the Supreme Leader) before being made public. In this context, the regime’s choice of a moderate candidate rather than a hawk like Jalili (the defeated competitor) should be part of a preventive strategy for hypothetical and quite likely destabilizing popular unrest, which, moreover, according to the Iranian persuasion and beyond, has the financial and material support of the US/Israeli services. In general, the Iranian people do not express excessive optimism regarding the immediate future, leaving it to themselves to judge by the facts, that is, by the concrete opportunities (improved living conditions and mitigation of the risks of conflict) that the new president will be presented with by the spiritual-military leaders.

If in domestic politics, euphemistically speaking, the regime has room for improvement, the foreign policy music sounds differently, which in turn, as elsewhere, is intertwined with the former. It would not be surprising if, given the constant threats and aggression to which the country is subjected, the regime responds by intensifying repression and hardening its positions, which may be precisely the desired outcome.

In foreign policy, however, the country defends its right to security and has no intention of succumbing to the intimidation of Little Satan (Israel), which, with America’s unconditional support, seeks to destabilize it by financing unrest, terrorist attacks, assassinating scientists (in Iran) and military advisers (Syria, Lebanon), right up to the latest provocation (April 1) – the bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, which was meant to provoke American intervention in response to Iranian intervention (which was instead contained and negotiated with the USA) in a widened conflict that in turn contributed to the final extermination of the Gaza population. On paper, the Jewish state’s priorities have nothing to do with Iran because they are centered on the destruction of the Palestinian people. This intention, however, involves presenting the Islamic Republic as a mortal threat to Israel, although the reality is the opposite: Israel/USA threatens Iran, not the other way around. This image also helps cover up longstanding human rights abuses by Israel in Palestine (well before October 7, 2023) and by the United States (coups d’état, targeted assassinations, such as the sensational assassination of Iranian General Q. Suleimani, on the part of the self-confessed Donald Trump, in January 2020 – secret prisons, systematic torture against anyone who obstructs the interests of the Empire, and other destabilization in the same vein: meanness, the evidence of which is now clear).

As for the United States, it balances on two sides of the scale: (a) on the one hand, the presentation of Iran as an existential threat to Israel favors the chaos theory, destructuring anyone who annoys the Jewish state, defending Palestinian rights, endless wars in the Middle East that strengthen the dollar and oil in favor of Wall Street corporations; (b) little interest in expanding the conflict in the Middle East, which, especially in an election year, would damage the economy, with inflation and oil prices soaring, stock market values plummeting, and so on. The choice is conditional, and there is no room for further detail here. Now the election of a new Iranian president will have little effect on any of this. Tehran will continue on its path to the East after the disappointments experienced from the West (including Europe, now relegated to the level of butler servant of its main ally), inclined to the senseless resource extraction policies of the American war-mongering oligarchy. Tehran’s membership in BRICS and SCO (2), along with the growing prospects for political and economic ties with Russia and China, including military ties with the former, remains a consolidated choice pertaining to high levels of government. Thus, while the moderate Pezeshkian justifies partial optimism in domestic politics (repressive softening of dissent and custom, gradual overturning of the old conservative interpretation of Quranic law, social policy), to the extent permitted by the Shi’ite clergy and the Guardians, in foreign policy the dynamics are structural.

In the regional theater, the country should be wary of direct involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which could provoke US intervention and unpredictable escalation that would threaten the very survival of the regime.

In the absence of shrewd statesmen – a rare commodity among Atlantic summits (and completely absent in vassal Europe) – who can get the hegemonic empire to distance itself from Zionist fundamentalism, notably in a region where there are Russian military contingents (which in Syria are known to guarantee the life of the Assad regime), tensions between Middle Eastern countries and the great powers are doomed to escalate.

Not only does history teach that the steering wheel can get out of control, but Trump’s likely return to the White House worsens the outlook in light of his known extremist positions on the Middle East and Israel.

Nor will Pezeshkian’s arrival affect the third point highlighted here, the nuclear issue. As is well known, the only country in the Middle East with atomic weapons is Israel, not Iran, a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which implicitly accepts the scrutiny of IAEA (3) inspectors, as well as the two most important international conventions on chemical and biological weapons, conventions that Israel (like very few other countries) has never ratified. Under the 2015 agreement, Tehran agreed to undergo further inspections for hypothetical deviations from civilian nuclear power authorized by the NPT to military nuclear power, which is prohibited.

However, this agreement never came into effect due to the traps set by the US “deep state,” which has always opposed peace with Iran. Then-President Obama tried an evolutionary path in relations with Tehran, seeking to abandon the image of an ontologically hostile country in favor of trade, investment, scientific, and cultural exchanges, etc. – tools underlying peaceful coexistence that would even enhance the ability to make the regime respect freedom and human rights. However, this plan was contrary to Israeli interests. It can be assumed that Trump’s decision (2018) to tear up the nuclear agreement signed by Obama three years earlier is the result of maneuvers by the Israel lobby, which Biden silently bowed to, even though, as Obama’s vice president, he shared the spirit and purpose of the agreement.

Even all of this cannot be greatly influenced by the newly elected President Pezeshkian.

(1) Mearshaimer and S. Walt: “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 2007.

(2) Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(3) International Atomic Energy Agency

Diplomat, Italian Ambassador to Tehran (2008-2012) and Beijing (2013-2015)

Alberto Bradanini