UK and USA: Special Relationship?

An article by: Donald Sassoon

What had long been presented as a particularly close relationship between Washington and London is revealing its limitations. By now it is clear that there is a leader and a wingman. And it is not just Trump's fault

The victory of Donald Trump has, unquestionably, perturbed many European states, not least because no one can really be certain what it is that American foreign policy will look like under “the Donald.” On the world stage, Trump touts an “America first” ideology that would make the US more isolationist, non-interventionist, and protectionist than at any time since the Second World War. At the same time, it is also likely to be less pro-Ukrainian, even more pro-Israel, more anti-China, and more anti-Iran.

All this will cause serious problems to the United Kingdom. The decision to leave the European Union meant that, in the eyes of the Brexiteers, the country was free to deal on a bilateral basis with everyone, above all with the USA, the country with which it had what it called a “special relationship.” Yet, even under Biden, no special trade deal emerged. In practice, the UK is more isolated than ever. It is now obvious even to some Brexiteers that leaving the European Union was a major blunder. The UK, cut off from Europe, now faces an imponderable American president.

The idea of a “special relationship” with the USA was “invented” by Winston Churchill and subsequently constantly used by a succession of British prime ministers. It was hardly ever mentioned by anyone in the USA except when a high-ranking British politician visited Washington. Then, out of politeness, the cliché is trotted out by the Americans as if to acknowledge British acquiescence if not subservience. The phrase was apparently banned by a British ambassador to Washington because he thought it added to the illusion that the USA had some influence over the UK. Yet on the news of Trump’s victory, it was instantly deployed by Keir Starmer, whose unoriginality will become legendary (assuming he will ever be remembered). He declared, “I know the special relationship will continue to prosper on both sides of the Atlantic for years to come.”

London’s constant invocation of a special link was used by Charles de Gaulle as the main justification for vetoing British membership into what was the European Economic Community. It would be the Trojan Horse of the US, he claimed. De Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969 paved the way for the UK’s accession. The British Prime Minister who was instrumental in this was the conservative Edward Heath, the one exception to subservience to the USA. As Kissinger noted in his memoirs, Edward Heath was the British politician “…least emotionally committed to the United States”, immune to the “sentimental… attachment forged in two wars” and convinced that the “special relationship” was an obstacle to Britain’s European vocation. Heath was content to enjoy no higher status in Washington than any other European leader. Indeed, he came close to insisting on receiving no preferential treatment. Kissinger’s words made it clear that the relationship was one-way: the British felt a special friendship; the Americans did not need to reciprocate and accepted what was given to them. They were the sovereign on the throne, not the courtiers on their knees.

Labour’s own pronounced subservience to the US was unnecessary. Now anxiety pervades even the British defense and foreign policy establishments, aware that they have no idea to what extent Trump’s campaign promises will be fulfilled and what the cost to the UK will be. Many are aware that Trump’s victory is only the symptom of a period of future turbulence in global affairs.

During the last Trump presidency, the UK was quite unable to obtain any concessions in trade, and Trump even called then-prime minister Theresa May “foolish” in a post on Twitter. Of great embarrassment for the Labour Government have been the deprecatory statements made by some of its leading politicians when they did not expect that Trump could possibly stage a comeback. Only a few years ago, David Lammy, now foreign secretary, called Donald Trump a “woman-hating, neo-Nazi-sympathizing sociopath” and a “profound threat to the international order.” Once Trump was elected, Lammy dismissed what he had said as “old stuff” and warmly congratulated Trump, adding that the British government “looked forward to working with you.”

Emily Thornberry, who was shadow foreign secretary in 2019 (and now Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Commons), argued that Trump should not have been granted a state visit to the UK because “he is a sexual predator and a racist.” Wes Streeting, now Health minister, declared that “Trump is such an odious, sad, little man.” Well, now subservience is back, and perhaps British politicians will learn not to make statements they will eventually regret, though, in politics, this is common and almost part of the job.

The main worries facing the British (but not just them) are American policies over tariffs, China, and NATO. There will be pressure to increase defense spending, but the UK would not be too sorry should the USA “drop” Ukraine or force the country to come to a settlement, though it pretends otherwise. Starmer’s new national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, has long advocated negotiating with enemies to bring about peace (he was instrumental to negotiating the peace deal with IRA). He is likely to favor a truce with Russia. In spite or assurances to the contrary, the Labour government is far less pro-Kyiv than its predecessors. It had been committed not to renew the supply of long-range missiles until Biden got him (and the French) to change his position. And Starmer has not visited Kyiv, though his predecessor, Rishi Sunak, visited Kyiv in within a month of becoming prime minister.

It has now become obvious that it is essential for the UK to patch things up with Europe, but it is a Europe in crisis, with Germany in political and economic disarray; a Europe where the forces of the far right are advancing – with the possibility of Marine Le Pen winning the next presidential elections in France. Trump’s victory brought delight in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and among the far right in the Netherlands. The recent trip by Starmer to Paris for the celebration of Armistice Day (the first British PM since Churchill to do so) was symbolic of trying to be nice to the French, but today one needs far more than symbols, thought symbols are cheaper and more easily deployed than concrete policies. They pledged their “unwavering” support for Ukraine, but few trust them.

Then there will be American pressures on the UK to harden its China policy, but China is now an indispensable economic partner as Starmer himself recognized in his recent meeting with Xi Jinping (the first between British and Chinese leaders since 2018). The UK is dependent of China for aspects of the green transition: solar panels, nuclear power, electric vehicles, etc. Even more worrying is the issue of trade. The EU is the UK main trading partner: 47% of UK export go to the EU, but 15% go to the US. Washington might demand from the UK unrestricted access to the British market for some products of the US agricultural sector, including chlorine-washed chicken and hormone-treated beef, which are anyway banned from the EU. The EU will almost certainly retaliate to American tariff, and the UK will face a difficult decision: whether to follow the EU or bend to American will.

It may ponder how to rephrase the famous quote attributed to Porfirio Diaz: “Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the US” turning it into “Poor England, far from God, far from Europe, and soon far from the US.”

Writer, emeritus professor in comparative European history at Queen Mary University (London)

Donald Sassoon