Opinions #37/24

It could be another bitter September for Vladimir Zelensky. A year ago, in these days, he had to state the failure of the widely announced spring counteroffensive. The move was meant to lead Kiev’s forces to recapture Donbass and Crimea after they pushed Moscow’s soldiers back across the border. The story went the other way: Russian troops gradually expanded the controlled territories and are now close to conquering the entire territory of the separatist regions. Now, in September 2024, the Ukrainian president must record the gradual cooling of his allies in the support they have guaranteed him °for as long as necessary. Rumors are multiplying in Europe about talks in which Kiev will have to start  negotiating on a ceasefire, putting on the table the issue of giving up some of its territory. The rhetoric of Ukraine’s °territorial integrity, challenged by Poroshenko and Zelensky’s failure to apply the fundamental point of the Minsk agreements – recognizing the autonomy status of Donetsk and Luhansk – has led to two and a half years of war and the loss of nearly a quarter of the country. Moreover, in the midst of a persuasion campaign launched in Europe and the USA to gain further military and economic support, Zelensky found himself facing something of a rubber wall. To back him up, as in the past, he found few governments other than his early associates, such as Stoltenberg and Borrell, who, unsurprisingly, are both close to leaving office: the former from NATO and the latter from the EU. After suffering the shock of losing one of the few F-16s received from the West and two US-trained pilots on his first sortie, the Ukrainian president found himself in an awkward position of having to explain the rationale for invading Russia’s Kursk region (where he had lost 90 percent of the best-trained units stationed there in a month) while his troops surrendered one position after another on the eastern front. September 2024 was made even more bitter by the negative reaction received from Washington after the Ramstein summit. Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin refused to supply Zelensky with missiles capable of striking deep into Russian territory “because Moscow has already taken steps to withdraw targets” listed by Ukrainian intelligence. Thus, there remains a “red line” drawn by the Kremlin beyond which Western aid to Kiev will lead to further, unpredictable escalation. Austin accompanied the decision with a statement about giving Kiev another $250 million (down from Biden’s $61 billion) and a consideration that, uttered by the four-star general, depressed Zelensky even more: “There is no way” of turning the war in Ukraine in Kiev’s favor. Not only that, but the political debate has changed tone in Germany since the regional elections on September 1. Chancellor Scholz, who has so far supported Kiev’s position, is now planning two initiatives in the name of a break. The first is his proposal for an agreement leading to a ceasefire, which should be presented to Moscow and Kiev and would involve ceding some Ukrainian territory to Russia. The second concerns the decision to shed light on the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which occurred two years ago and is now officially attributed to the hands of the West. Two years in which the German government avoided addressing the topic, even though it proved devastating to the country’s economy. Finally, another black cloud over the skies of Kiev is opinion polls on the US presidential election. Surprisingly, the novelty effect in favor of Kamala Harris seems to have worn off. With the expectation that the electorate’s mood will stabilize after the September 10 televised debate on ABC, the strengthening consensus around Trump’s candidacy remains. A result that New York Times chief political analyst Nate Cohn explained in recent days as follows: “Yes, he has conservative views on many issues, such as immigration. But he has also taken many positions that a decade ago would have been more likely for a Democrat than a Republican, such as opposing benefit cuts, supporting a cooperative relationship with Russia, or opposing free trade.” So, this time, contrary to tradition and, above all, the vulgarity of the media, foreign policy risks becoming an irrelevant topic in the White House challenge. And if the “change” demanded by more than 60 percent of Americans comes at the expense of less international exposure, Trump’s endorsement of Robert Kennedy Jr. in favor of restoring relations with Moscow could prove decisive. We’ll know in less than two months. Meanwhile, in less than a month, it will be the first anniversary of the start of the Gaza war, the horrors of which seem endless. Prime Minister Netanyahu continues his hunt for Hamas leaders, slaughtering a frightening number of Palestinian civilians. An opportunity to rely on the West’s impotence in general and its main ally in particular. A story analyzed with sharp clarity by Pascal Boniface, who sees Tel Aviv’s responsibility intersecting with Washington’s. While much of the rest of the world also draws from this situation additional motivation to rebalance global governance. Starting with top financial bodies, such as the World Bank. The purpose, as Robert Wade illustrates in detail in his investigation, is a comprehensive defense of the existing privileges of Western powers.