Opinions #20/24

In this phase of polycrisis, marked by two wars, the seeds of a new post-war structure are destined to manifest themselves when the guns fall silent. And there are already those who are eager to understand who will lose the most in a dynamic, which, on the contrary, could offer ideas of advantage. The case of France is a landmark case. By abandoning the Gaullist position that for more than half a century has allowed Paris to profit from critical adherence to the Atlanticist scheme, France – the only nuclear power in the European Union – risks being marginalized. This is the Macron effect. And on the other side of the Atlantic, the preliminary stages of the November election battle are playing out. The two candidates representing the official parties, Biden and Trump, are watched daily by pollsters. Trump is still ahead, and despite his legal problems, voters still favor him. The choice, Andrew Spannaus analyzes, is the result of both reality and the perception of economic and social problems, starting with immigration, which the United States has been experiencing for several years. Moreover, immigration risks becoming an important element in the upcoming European elections as well. Effects will be observed even in closely related but neighboring countries, such as Ukraine and Poland. Warsaw, Massimo Nava argues, is a Western military outpost with an anti-Russian function, in possession of powerful rearmament. But it will not agree to lose any of its EU membership benefits in favor of its Ukrainian “brothers.”

Alessandro Cassieri

Editor in chief