Indochina, New Eldorado

The Asian continent today is divided between three spheres of influence. Western thalassocracies (dominant at sea, translator’s note) retain a strong influence on the maritime periphery of the Far East (blue on the map). Continental powers, cooperating with each other, own the body of Eurasia (red on the map). The neutral powers, for their part, located in the southwestern quarter of Asia (green on the map), represent a glacis (protective zone, t/n), a stepping stone, a border space, cooperating with opposing geopolitical camps. Asian neutral countries are currently marked by a strong diplomatic renaissance, as they carry a delicate balance between antagonistic powers.

Destabilized by growing geopolitical risks and unable to anticipate future risks because they rely on inefficient statistical tools, transnational corporations are concentrating their investments in the low alluvial plains of these neutral spaces, traditionally reserved for agricultural life. This movement responds to a security need, as well as geo-economic reality: the center of gravity of the world economy has shifted toward Eurasia, transnational corporations need to get closer together as much as possible, while avoiding Upper Asia, where they are barricading one another. Thus, the neutral Asian spaces have become a field for dialogue and circumvention maneuvers.

In this geopolitical context, the Indochina Peninsula occupies a remarkable position. Located at the crossroads of empires, it includes the Chineseized part, Vietnam and Laos, as well as the Indian territory consisting of Cambodia, Siam, and Burma. “Very roughly, the Indochinese peninsula can be described as consisting of two triangular regions (the Red River in the north and the Mekong in the south), connected by the ridge of the Annamite chain” (1).

It should be noted that the Red River basin was Chineseized, and the Mekong basin was Indianized. In an effort to regain its historical influence in a Chineseized region, China is pursuing a complex strategy in the Indochina Peninsula, where each state responds with its own rebalancing.

For Vietnam, the Chinese presence is particularly important in its one million square kilometer exclusive economic zone. This marine area contains significant fish resources, as well as oil and gas deposits. This maritime space, controlled by six straits, is a high-tension zone and is all the more strategically significant, because 50% of the world’s commercial cargo passes through it. Hanoi is trying to avoid Chinese control by developing its gas economy, which accounts for 25% of Vietnam’s GDP. With the third largest gas reserves in ASEAN, Vietnam is in the process of equipping itself with the necessary infrastructure to meet the ever-growing domestic demand. On the other hand, the intensification of agriculture is accompanied by the implementation of 14 free trade agreements that allow powerful foreign agro-industrial groups to establish themselves there. Finally, Hanoi is trying to continue its rapprochement with the United States by attracting technology multinationals to its soil. Thus, in 2024, Vietnam will benefit from decoupling the Chinese and American economies. The Apple Group is widely recognized there. The same is true for Chinese companies looking to circumvent American restrictions on imports of Chinese products. Taiwanese tech giants have also decided to move some of their production to Vietnam to avoid China-US tensions. Thus, a geo-economic realignment, favorable to the remaining neutral Indochina Peninsula, is taking shape, where the business world is discreetly making contacts between two globalized spheres competing with each other.

A similar development can be seen in Cambodia, which China has made a key focus of its neighborhood diplomacy by developing a six-party cooperation framework for the diamond industry. This is not stopping Cambodia from attracting major international clothing brands seeking to base their decarbonization on local green energy. In Laos, on the other hand, the Chinese pressure is very strong. The reason is simple: Laos’s position allows it to skirt the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, territories at the center of high tension. In the heart of this over-indebted country, China continues to build several major communication routes: the highway will double the 422-kilometer railway line between Vientiane and Chinese territory. Thailand, which has good growth prospects for 2024, is also concerned about rail links to Chinese communication routes: a colossal project worth more than five billion euros has laid the groundwork for the country’s first high-speed TGV train, which is due to connect the capital Bangkok to Kunming in 2028. This nation should significantly increase trade with Russia, while maintaining relations with the USA. The same is true for Burma, which is currently receiving arms and oil from Russia.

Thus, in the short term, world peace will depend on the spirit of openness and moderation of active and enterprising neutral states that put their own development above influence games aimed at preserving the outdated hegemon. As for the amnesia-stricken inventors of the multiworld, they will have to recognize that this philosophical byproduct of dismemberment applies to their own disguised unilateralism.

(1) Marlene Bouchy, “Forestry History of Indochina (1850-1954): Research Perspectives,” Colonization and the Environment, Paris: French Society for Foreign History, 1993, pp. 219-249. (Foreign Historical Library. Research, 13).