Once Upon a Time There Was Global France

If History is a river that changes direction depending on the obstacles it encounters, it is also true that its development occurs through turning points. Unnoticeable in some cases, traumatic in others. It often develops from the first stage to the second. Specialists do their best to find the root causes of these shocks, but almost always succeed much later. At this point in the 21st century, the interpretation seems simpler. And the reason is relatively simple: the bipolar world that emerged at the end of World War II, after the Yalta Conference, began to change long before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Philippe Devillers called the 1975 Helsinki Conference the end of the balance between the former victorious allies in the fight against Nazism. In doing so, Moscow capitulated on three principles that would put it in a position of inferiority compared to the West: inviolability of borders, free dissemination of ideas and information, and freedom of movement for people.

The catalyzing force of the Euro-Atlantic model from that point forward would diminish the attractiveness of the USSR, gradually causing its appeal to regress toward a world that looked to the Soviet model out of conviction or convenience.

Years of progressive development of American hegemony followed, allowing to enjoy a long favorable period of history to lay the foundations for a second “American Century.” No more parentheses, because already after the collapse of the USSR, an ultra-sophisticated analyst like Zbigniew Brzezinski, former advisor to President Carter, picked up on the upward trend taking place in the East. Of the three US records – military, economic, and moral – he argued that within 20 to 30 years, the United States would retain only the military record. China’s development has just begun, but its potential has already been realized.

The end of the first quarter of this century announces another turning point. And it concerns the relations between North and South, or between the collective West and the Global South. Jean de Gliniasti addresses this problem by developing different analyses based on the role of France. Paris, writes de Gliniasti in Le Monde Diplomatique, could take advantage of the ongoing evolution of international relations to enhance its historic role in Europe and the Middle East. Symptoms of a changing scenario and balance of power – this is the thesis of the former French ambassador to Moscow – would allow Macron to position France favorably. In a general framework where the West’s military superiority is undermined (referring to the Gaza cases and the specific threats of the Yemeni Houthis to world trade), and its ability to influence the economic course of its adversaries and enemies is reduced through an unprecedented number of sanctions (from Russia to China, from Venezuela to Iran), in the struggle with the gradual decline of its economic weight in the global basket in favor of a world led by the BRICS countries, the trend of the Euro-Atlantic West does represents not an added value for Paris, but a brake. The same can be said for Europe more generally.

The primacy that Macron could have regained by preserving the Gaullist spirit was lost in the first stages of the new scenario imposed by History. Inciting war against Russia, combined with Israel’s line in the war against Hamas, sidelined from a dialog with Iran that has seen him as a protagonist in recent years, Macron’s foreign policy thrives on short circuits. The only anchor of the previous season, architected by Macron himself, remains his prudent stance towards Xi Jinping’s China, which has just been reaffirmed. The only element that distances Paris from the “Westernized” line, which risks causing France, after failing in Africa with a humiliating retreat from the Sahel, to lose the opportunity granted by History to a regional power equipped with nuclear weapons, at a time when the world is disintegrating into different poles of power, is the ability to count.