Persia – Levant, Iran’s Mediterranean Vocation

We cannot forget that Iran’s interest in the Levant is part of a millennia-long history of complementarity that goes far beyond current events. In fact, the Iranian Plateau is a geographical area with sufficiently severe natural restrictions, so life can develop there only in a limited way, thriving in the gaps located between the mountain peaks and the dry plains. Civilizations were able to thrive on high plateaus, extracting from the poor nature the resources needed to multiply life. In this special space, unique islands of culture were able to emerge, facilitated by relative isolation.

Thus, Iran endowed itself with creative, spiritual, and military power. However, it could not shine in the Middle East while remaining confined to the island it occupies. Its regional power became effective only when the Persian imaginary brain, located on the high plateau, took possession of the Babylonian womb, the navel of agricultural power. When this connection between the brain and the stomach becomes effective, Iran will be able to find an important engine located on the Mediterranean coast, in the Levant.

The Mediterranean coast is actually the gateway to the sea of an essentially continental empire, which is softened by sea openings. When communication between Persia and the Levant was effective, the empire flourished. In 525 BC. The Achaemenids captured the coasts of Syria and Egypt. Their Greek enemy understood perfectly well that by capturing this coast, the Empire would deprive itself of a vital outlet. It was for this reason that Alexander the Great, acting surgically, began by seizing the provinces of Syria and Egypt in order to put his enemy in a sensitive financial position. Later, the Romans, having captured the Levant, blocked the Parthian expansion.

The Sassanid era then represents the second experiment of the Iranian strategic triplet. Coming from the province of Fars, the new sovereigns again connected the Iranian plateau with Mesopotamia, having conquered the Levant from the Byzantines. Thus, a new powerful empire was born. When it was conquered by the Arabs, the latter took care of establishing their capital in Damascus in order to rule Persia from this prosperous periphery. As for the Mongols, although they took Baghdad in 1258, their expansion stopped when they encountered Mamluk resistance in Syria. Seeking total dominance, they tried to take the Mamluks from behind by uniting with the Christian kingdoms of the West (1). However, the division of their empire complicated this attempt. A very clear division then separated the Mamluks of Egypt, who controlled Syria and Palestine, and the Ilkhanids, who exercised their authority over Iran and Mesopotamia (2).

Thus, between the Iranian Plateau and the Levant, the combinations are extremely varied. However, Iran is unable to gain power when it is hermetically sealed – then its creative power dries up. British historian Arnold Toynbee, who studied the rise and fall of civilizations, recognized that they were driven by creative minorities. They must be imaginative enough to find innovative responses to the challenges that shape their history. However, these creative minorities prosper under certain privileged conditions. The map shows the most creative areas of the Muslim world according to the places of origin of their scientists. This highlights the combined creative power of the Iran-Iraq-Syria axis.

However, Persia’s attraction to the Mediterranean was blocked by the Sykes-Picot agreements (1916), according to which the heart of the Persian power – Mesopotamia – belonged to Great Britain, and the secondary engine – Syria – belonged to France. Since then, regardless of the alliance that it is part of, Iran has quietly sought to reach the western lungs of the Levant. The reason is simple: Persia, a creative force, finds its equilibrium in the concert of nations only when it is ventilated by external streams of ideas.

These various historical elements allow us to anticipate what Iran’s geopolitical position will be in the coming decades. Cut off from access to the sea by the Russian and British empires in the 19th century, Iran will tomorrow seek to reconnect with the main sea routes, allowing it to establish its power. The idea is not to simply follow in the footsteps of the dead Persian empires. The Persian Gulf is too shallow for Iranian submarines to operate undetected. This is one of the reasons why Iran is seeking access to the high seas. However, the latter is firmly integrated into Turkey, with which it shares a common history. As we know, economic integration automatically leads to geopolitical rapprochement. This is very interesting because of its complementarity with the Turkish maritime power. More generally, Iran will strive in the future to achieve a balance between four poles: India, China, Europe, and the United States. Uncomfortably aware that rigid and unwieldy alliances would soon collapse in the world’s new diplomatic liquidity, it would resume its millefeuille diplomacy to advance its interests through delicate and complex maneuvers. In the Levant, Iran would push New Phenicia to later expand to another Carthage.

(1) Jean RICHRARD, “The Mongol Embassy in Paris in 1262,” Journal des Savants, 1979, pp. 295-303. A 1262 Mongol letter sent to the King of France “opens with a preamble which very precisely sets out the titles of the dynasty descended from Genghis Khan, who was to dominate the whole world in order to establish peace. Its author, whose name is here written by Huyleu cham, presents himself as the destroyer of the Muslim power and the friend of Christianity and asks the King of France to submit to the Mongol dominion, explaining to him how divine favor was shown to him, by recounting the various stages of the campaign that has begun by the destruction of the Assassins, continued by the capture of Baghdad (and the author does not forget to mention his own condescension and respect for the Nestorian Catholicos and local Christians), which temporarily ended with the destruction of the Sultanate of Aleppo and Damascus and the execution of the Sultan, guilty of treason.”

(2) Denise AIGLE, “The invasion of Kazan Khan in Syria. Controversy over its conversion to Islam and the presence of Christians in its armies,” a conversation led by Kathia Zakharia, 2009. “The Mamluks and Ilkhans fought a merciless ideological war for more than fifty years, but also with weapons in their hands. Between 1260 and 1316, the Ilkhans launched six military campaigns in Syria, most of them when the Mongol rulers of Iran became Muslim. The adoption of Islam by Kazan Khan (1295-1304) shortly before his 1295 enthronement did not ease tensions between the two powers. However, his commitment to Islam caused a great stir in Damascus, where Sheikh Sadr al-Din Ibrahim, who professed the faith, spoke about it in the ribat located next to the Umayyad Mosque. However, instead of establishing peace, the Ilkhans tried three times to capture Bilad al-Sham. The first campaign took place in the winter of 699/1299-1300 and had some success, as Syria was temporarily occupied. Kazan Khan led his second invasion in autumn of 1300, but due to particularly harsh climatic conditions, no clashes occurred between the Mongol troops and the Mamluk forces. Both armies were forced to turn back. Finally, the third campaign, in which the sick Ilkhan did not personally participate, was led by his great Mongol emir Baha al-Din Qutlug-Shah, who, at the head of a probably insufficient army, was defeated on April 20, 1303 at Maru al-Shuffar near Damascus.”