1994 – 2024: Rwanda Thirty Years Later

In the spring of thirty years ago, the world was rocked by one of the most frightening tragedies of our time: the Rwandan genocide. From early April through early June, hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children were killed. The gruesome count reached a million bodies, most of them dismembered with a knife. The ethnic clash between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups was sparked by a long-running power struggle in the country and in neighboring Burundi. The absurd balance after Belgian colonial rule facilitated the rule of the Tutsi elite in Burundi and the military control of the Hutus in Rwanda, without taking into account the ethnic and territorial imbalance in both countries.

In Rwanda, it was the Tutsis who fared the worst, as the Hutu militias and the regular army were armed and politically backed by President François Mitterrand’s France, which bears much responsibility for the tragedy. Shared responsibility is now confirmed by historical research and finally by public dossiers. A commission set up by the Elysee Palace emphasized “support for the regime that planned the preparation of genocide.”

It all started on the evening of April 6 when Rwandan President Habyarimana, a Hutu, had his plane shot down by a missile. The president was returning from a conference in Tanzania that was another attempt to reach an agreement between ethnic and political factions: the Hutu majority in power and the Tutsi minority excluded from public life and decimated by massacres and exodus since independence from Belgium. The shooting down of the plane, never accurately identified, was the spark of an extermination that had been brewing for some time before the eyes of a modest UN contingent, fueled by propaganda and generous arms shipments to the regular army and the death squads determined to finish off the Tutsis once and for all.

But the Tutsis reorganized in neighboring Uganda, the diaspora provided volunteers and weapons, and they eventually prevailed, also benefiting from an interposition intervention organized, albeit late, by France under Operation Turquoise.

They were led by Paul Kagame, a young officer educated in the USA. In the field tent, he promised the country’s rebirth, reconciliation, and democracy. From colonel he became president and – election after election – remains so to this day. For thirty years, Rwanda has lived in peace, security, and prosperity, maintaining order at home and exporting its military capabilities outside the country. This is a curious case from an African laboratory: an authoritarian regime consolidated by the memory of massacres that opposes social unrest and silences opponents; enlightened enough to make good use of investment and aid from abroad; unscrupulous to the point of managing Danish and British migrant flows for a fee (with agreements similar to the Italy-Albania pact).

The Rwandan army is combat-capable and well-armed. The heart-shaped country becomes the gendarme of Africa, a little Prussia involved in interposition missions and aggressive operations in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of the rebels of the M23 movement. The vast mineral wealth of this country is at stake. This is the shocking paradox of genocide: once the trials were completed, revenge and retribution were carried out, Paul Kagame’s little kingdom became a model state not only by African standards. Rwanda is one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, with an average growth rate of over 7% per annum over the past two decades. Life expectancy has increased from 50 to 69 years. The latest World Bank report ranks Rwanda 38th out of 190 countries and second among African countries after Mauritius. The number of households with access to electricity has increased from 10% in 2010 to 75.3% in October 2022. Approximately 87% of adult Rwandans (6.2 million) have access to a cell phone.

French President Macron has sent Rwanda $495 million dollars in development aid with the express purpose of ending the dispute over France’s very serious responsibilities.

Following missions in the Central African Republic and Mozambique, Rwanda is also trying to establish itself in the Sahel, which is flooded with radical Islamic groups, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin. According to the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Rwanda is the fifth largest donor to UN missions in the world and the second largest on the continent. Despite their small numbers, Rwandan soldiers have earned a reputation for excellence. United Nations peacekeeping missions are often criticized, while African Union missions are often ineffective. Bilateral cooperation, however, is yielding some results.

But it is clear that Rwanda is not satisfied with providing gratuitous services to other countries. Presence in Mozambique and the Central African Republic has facilitated access to mining and agricultural activities, enabled the signing of infrastructure contracts and commercial relationships. And a UN report stigmatizing the long military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo is still pending.

The paradoxes don’t end here. In the hierarchy of aid and investment, the consciousness of the world (and France) favors Rwanda.

But Africa’s geopolitics have also changed over the last thirty years. Spheres of influence and old colonial logic have been overturned by China’s vast financial and logistical penetration capabilities, as well as by the unscrupulous actions of Wagner’s Russian mercenaries. In this new turmoil, the presence of Islamic guerrillas made itself felt, especially in the Sahel region, which favored coups d’état, mostly at the expense of friends of France’s old regime.

The coups in Gabon, Mali, and Niger are the latest in the series, with nine in the past three years. Huge energy and mining interests are at stake, as well as containing radical Islamism and migration flows exacerbated by political and economic instability. “There is a coup epidemic throughout the Sahel,” Macron acknowledged. The mistakes and limitations of French policy in Africa stem from afar, just think of commercial relations with the elite, who are often at home in Paris when it comes to transferring personal wealth to France, investing in real estate, or signing arms contracts. Sometimes the past doesn’t go away.