The progressive definition of a multipolar world is changing the structure of alliances. Economy, weaponry, and technology are important assets. But the geographical location of the disputed countries is no less important.
Today’s world is troubled by numerous conflicts: the preservation and respect of national identity, the response to the unpredictable Covid 19 pandemic, the challenge of climate change through the definition of sustainable development – all of this has contributed to the radicalization of political, economic, and military competition between countries. Today the planet is faced with a new bipolarism, a new cold war, and it is no longer between East and West, as in the period from 1946 to 1991, but between North and South, that is, between the rich and the less rich world.
This new expression of international competition is manifested essentially between the Western bloc (North) and the rest of the world (South). The group of Western countries includes NATO plus some countries close to it in political position (Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Japan). In total, there are about forty nations out of about 200 world’s countries. The bloc of countries representing the South essentially consists of a growing bloc of so-called developing countries (BRICS), namely Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, plus countries that got integrated into it a couple of months ago (Argentina, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia). Although the Western group does not seem to have much potential for expansion and consolidation, the BRICS+ group appears to have excellent opportunities for development due to the integration of dozens of countries in Africa and Asia, Central and South America, and Oceania. It is a severe competition between a rich world, which seems increasingly locked in an ivory tower to protect its wealth, and a poor world, sensitive to the redistribution of wealth and the wider sharing of resources. Other regional security organizations also operate within BRICS+ and on its borders, such as the important Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Central Asian Cooperation Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Community.
What trend of Eurasian cooperation can geographical proximity contribute to? Inevitably, the geographical proximity and territorial continuity can only benefit trade between countries in the Eurasian region. But this will ultimately lead to increased geopolitical tensions between the two blocs. Let’s try to figure out the reasons. The Western world continues to view the United States of America as the inescapable reference model, both for its interpretation of capitalism and for its security guarantees. This presupposes a series of agreements that allow for the establishment of strong ties capable of maintaining and protecting the integrity of the Western bloc. NATO is the fundamental instrument of this system. Created in 1949 to protect capitalist and democratic countries from the potential expansionism of Soviet communism during the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance, through its integrated defense system (NATO), did not break apart after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), but was preserved due to the plausible goals of continental balance and security. In fact, it seemed to become an increasingly indispensable instrument for the implementation of the strategic goals of United States’ foreign policy in Europe. In particular, NATO’s haphazard eastward expansion seemed to blatantly conflict with the security needs of the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics, such as Belarus and, in part, Moldova. The deep Ukrainian crisis, which has plagued Ukrainians, Russians, and Europeans for ten years, from 2013 to the present day, is the first indicator of this clash of strategies and interests.
The People’s Republic of China, just at the moment when the Ukrainian crisis began to flare up in front of European public opinion, launched a new grandiose development project in 2013, adopting the concept of a new Silk Road (the Belt and Road Initiative), so dear to Europeans. This idea seemed attractive to more and more countries. It was about planning useful investments to strengthen land and sea connections between Asia and Europe, in order to expand trade in goods and services in the Eurasian region. The project did not please the United States, which has tried to dissuade many countries from joining the Chinese proposal to avoid growing dependence on Beijing. But the project developed and seduced a significant number of Asian and European countries: economic and political diplomacy worked tirelessly to create a cohesive bloc of countries to initiate medium- and long-term investments in the construction of roads, highways, railway lines, ports, intermodal logistics hubs. However, the United States of America has made clear efforts to boycott this project and strengthen bilateral diplomatic relations with countries in Europe and Asia that would play a key role in the new Silk Road. In this regard, the examples of India and Italy are illustrative. India, together with Russia, is an extremely important part of the creation of the new Silk Road. Playing on the delicate relationship between New Delhi and Beijing, Washington is trying to establish a privileged relationship with New Delhi at both the bilateral and multilateral levels (the QUAD agreement is convincing in this regard, despite the difficulties of the agreement between the Pacific countries). But the relationship between India and the People’s Republic of China seems to prevail within the framework of BRICS+, although India maintains a neutral position at the international political level, ready to retain the freedom to always guarantee its independence of choice and action. In fact, if India refused to join the new Silk Road, it would easily be replaced by the Russian Federation and other former Asian Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) to develop a line that would eventually deliver goods to the north of India, from Xi’an to Turpan, to Samarkand, to Gorgan, Ankara, Istanbul, and then to Europe. The railway route from China to Kazan, Moscow, and Prague will be developed even further to the north. On both routes, the key countries are the former Soviet republics, as well as Iran and Turkey – all countries aligned with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, Turkey is also a member of NATO. These alternatives make us think that India, too, in order not to be left out of trade, will want to join the new Silk Road project. The axis between Moscow and Beijing, which has consolidated in proportion to the worsening Ukrainian crisis, appears to be the fundamental basis of the new Silk Road project.
The Italian case provides an interesting example of the conflict of interests between the constraints presented by NATO and the economic prospects offered by the geographical location. After signing an agreement in 2019 with Beijing to develop a new Silk Road, the maritime terminal of which could be the port of Trieste, the current Italian government, after repeated pressure from Washington, appears inclined not to renew such an agreement in December 2023. NATO’s coercive diplomacy, fueled by the United States, appears to take precedence over economic interests favored by the geographical location. But Chinese diplomacy seems to be in no hurry and not driven by haste. The territorial proximity between the countries of Eurasia remains over time, the connecting routes could be differentiated depending on the political cooperation between the countries involved, but the process continues, and the interests of Central-Eastern Europe seem neither vague nor insignificant. Italy is suffering, but one day it will have to make a decision beyond coercive diplomacy.