West And The Rest: Towards Multiglobalization?

The material and intangible devastation of Western democracies – devalued, commodified, and unreliable – is both a symptom and a condition for maintaining the privileges of the 1% who sit at the top of the pyramid.

Contrary to the sound advice not to risk predictions, especially when they concern the future, we will attempt to approximate possible scenarios, starting with critical exegesis, keeping in mind that every statement in the article is apodictic by definition and therefore requires the reader’s indulgence.

Evidence suggests that the world outside the West (6.5–7.2 billion individuals, depending on the reference constellation) is extremely heterogeneous. One part does not have the strength to resist US dominance, the other is inclined to herd positions, the third intends to play an active role, breaking out of the clutches of Western corporatism. Some dare to openly challenge the mystified teleology of political scientist F. Fukuyama, according to which all peoples of the planet are destined to fall into the vortex of liberal democracy/market economy. An epistemology of academic origins that aims to perpetuate imperial privilege through ideological neocolonialism.

Overall, despite many pitfalls, the non-Western world (more populous and teleologically motivated) is today experiencing an unprecedented moment of explosive growth.

Here is some data. According to International Monetary Fund forecasts, as of December 31, 2023, the G7 countries’ GDP will be $45.910 billion in international purchasing power (IPP) and $52.151 billion in purchasing power parity (PPP). For the BRICS countries, the data is respectively $27.651 billion in IPP and $56.045 billion in PPP, which is already higher, although the G7 actually contains seven, while BRICS have only five! If we add the countries that have already applied for participation – Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Venezuela, Vietnam, Honduras, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand, Ethiopia – the GDP of the BRICS countries (according to IMF forecasts) in December 2023 will reach $35.313 billion in IPP and $77.622 in PPP.

There is no doubt that if Western non-members are added to the G7, the wealth of the developed world will become even greater. However, distances are getting shorter every day, as the developing world grows at a higher average rate.

Thus, poor countries are no longer locked into their fate, and as incomes rise, they also experience gradual de-Westernization and de-Americanization, albeit with distinct emphases and paces depending on time and context. This process is not a prelude to the abandonment of a definitively pluralistic international order, but rather a redefinition of value, economic, and politico-military interactions that will change the distribution of power and wealth, especially if the resisting nations are able to defend their sovereignty against neocolonial interference.

For small and medium-sized countries in particular, this process represents an insidious horizon, susceptible to threats and blackmail, as neocolonial forces tend to hide behind good intentions, cultural exchanges, trade, and investment.

Another neologism is even easier to read, which, if it became a reality, would jeopardize the stability of the Kingdom of Good. This would be a (hypothetical) US-China bi-globalization, modeled on the United States and the Soviet Union of the Cold War era. Not only does the US vehemently oppose this hypothesis, but it is completely untrue.

As we know, the moment of US unipolarity expired at the turn of the 21st century, coinciding with the return of Russia and the consolidation of the rise of China. With this, the hypothetical oligopoly of a lucky few, the so-called great powers, which China could join only by agreeing to the invasion of Western capitalism, at least in the medium term, also disappeared from the scene. A difficult fate for Beijing.

The Cold War was rooted in the ideological contrast between different political, economic, and institutional models. Belonging to one front or another meant choosing a side: capitalism or communism, centralized or market economy, electoral law or democratic centralism. 34 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall (but not of all forms of twentieth-century communism, where the Soviet Empire did not have a monopoly), a hypothetical divergence between the West (the US-led West) and the resisting rest of the world (the rest: BRICS-3, SCO-4, etc.), which attributed constitutive ideological characteristics to these two camps, would be unfounded. The main reason for today’s contrast between the two camps is based on the concept of sovereignty/independence, which implies freedom of choice on the part of each individual of the economic and institutional system, in which he intends to live and prosper: while in the West, control of wealth is in private hands (which control politics, information, and academia), in China (and to a lesser extent in Russia, Venezuela, Iran, and others, in addition to the another four surviving communist countries), it is in the hands of the state, which is a much tougher barrier.

As for China, which is the main opponent of US unipolarity, it shows no intention of replacing the latter. For the Beijing leadership, these ambitions are incompatible with its traditions and, above all, with its interests. After the country’s political stability and unity, its priority is actually economic growth, which would be jeopardized if costly geopolitical or military goals were imposed (according to the US model).

Finally, and this is the third reason, the resisting/developing world is claiming its share. In addition to Russia, a medium economic power but a huge military power, the BRICS includes India, Brazil, South Africa, and soon other countries that are striving to emerge from their state of backwardness, while maintaining their national identities, without accepting a single model, even the Chinese one, which also boasts outstanding achievements thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s famous reform and opening-up policy (1978).

Thus, the multipolarity appearing on the horizon makes it possible to legitimize the lack of homogeneity of economic or institutional systems based on the universalization of Deng Xiaoping’s brilliant formula: the color of the cat (political-ideological system) does not matter, as long as it catches mice (development).

In short, the future will witness the supposed imposition of multi-globalization with a modular presence, with three great powers (USA, China, and Russia) and other countries united for interests or security. As for the European Union, or whatever we call it, which has been no longer a major player on the international stage for some time, it will be able to regain its role by stopping its economic decline only if another ruling class finds the courage to take the path of creating a European Confederation of Sovereign States. But that’s another story, and the hope expressed, in this situation, is highly unlikely.