Opinions #52/23

New year, old conflicts. But above all, the war, which has been ongoing since 2022, is affecting European geopolitics far beyond initial forecasts. It took some time for EU countries to become full-fledged actors in the dispute between Russia and Ukraine. First they focused on a quick solution, whatever that might be. Then on quick negotiations, under the illusion that those held in Belarus at the beginning of hostilities, and then those sponsored by Erdogan in Turkey, would achieve an immediate ceasefire. It was the end of March two years ago, and it was also the end of illusions.

In Kyiv, ready to accept the terms of neutrality by refusing to join NATO, Moscow’s declared strategic goal, the allies said that it was the wrong decision. And that the war must be continued, because by then it had gone beyond the borders of Ukraine. This position was vigorously supported by then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, the leader of a group of countries (led by the Baltic states), who saw the ongoing war as an opportunity for “redde rationem” with Russia.

Since then, Europe has gradually been drawn into the dynamics of an avoidable and counterproductive war over its interests. By truly committing to the Minsk agreements they promoted, France and Germany could have avoided escalating tensions. But a year ago, one after another, almost overcome by the need for catharsis, Merkel and Hollande admitted that they were using the Minsk agreements to buy time for Ukrainian rearmament.

Instead of pursuing the “two F” strategic solution, strongly advocated by expert statesmen, such as Henry Kissinger and Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, Paris and Berlin opted for warmongering. The first letter “F” meant the Finlandization, or neutrality of Ukraine. The second letter “F” meant the federalization of the country: a single state with its territorial integrity, within which the special status of the two autonomous regions of Donbass – Donetsk and Lugansk – would be recognized. “Like Italy with Trentino-Alto-Adige,” was repeated then. This was the solution provided among the ten clauses of “Minsk 1” and “Minsk 2.”

So, on with the war, and to a bitter end. In a kind of competition to appear irreconcilable towards Putin, representatives of European institutions constantly put forward conditions for impossible negotiations. Supported or sponsored by the rulers of historically pacifist countries, projected into a dimension of muscular confrontation, alien to the political culture of the continent that emerged in pieces and under guardianship after the Second World War.

Sanction after sanction, funding after funding, then moving on to equipping and ammunitioning the Ukrainian army, the Europeans find themselves, like the USA, involved in a confrontation, from which, unlike the Americans, they have nothing to gain. Not previously, when it was possible to defuse the causes of the conflict, not presently, when the war is affecting the economy of the entire continent, and not in the future.

Paradoxically, precisely what Europe has in its future perspective is the source of greatest concerns. After one leap in the dark that resulted in the sacrifice of the economic benefits of Russian energy supplies, the EU has outlined the conditions for trying another one. Ukraine’s membership in this club is only a hypothesis, rather distant, but sufficient to cause deep concern in the same economic circles that are most favorable to Kyiv. They indicate that such accession would entail a significant financial burden on countries that are net donors, starting with Germany and France, and would subtract resources from those that, on the contrary, are net beneficiaries (such as Italy, after receiving the first tranches of the National Recover and Resilience Plan).

Economic consequences are projected onto social conditions, which, in turn, have political consequences that the European elections in June may reveal in dimensions yet to be discovered. But there is not only this impact, which is relevant in itself. That’s not all.

“The EU has worked hard to curb European nationalism, but the desire for nationhood runs deep. As Kyiv pushes its way into Europe, Ukraine and countries across the continent will have to resist the pull of ethnic nationalism and instead channel nationalist impulses into civic patriotism. It will take diplomatic dexterity to reconcile Ukraine’s national strength with the EU’s post-national spirit.”

The analysis, published in Foreignaffairs magazine, was conducted by Michael Kimmage, a historian and specialist on Eastern Europe at the US State Department during the Obama administration.