Elections In Argentina: Ancient Evils Of Populism

Among international experts, one can often find analysis that shows the convergence of positions between the recently elected President of Argentina, Javier Milei, the President of Brazil in his last term, Jair Bolsonaro, and Donald Trump. These three represent modern anti-political and anti-systemic neo-populism, the result of the global crisis of liberal democracies and discrediting towards the welfare states that guaranteed the political stability of capitalism in rich countries.

However, for those observing the international situation from Latin America, other aspects may seem no less interesting. What do Javier Milei, Jair Bolsonaro, and Lula da Silva, the recently elected third-term president of Brazil, have in common? What about Sergio Massa and Fernando Haddad, the candidates defeated by Milei, and Bolsonaro, what do they have in common?

Let’s start with the two latter: they are both typical party leaders, they were ministers and represent the way of thinking and acting of their parties: leftists, committed to the functioning and values of modern liberal democracy. The other three, to the contrary, represent different political and ideological agendas, but are similar in their successful populist strategies that ultimately brought them to power.

Milei and Bolsonaro are on the right, Lula is on the left. But the first two – despite the fact that they clearly profess anti-system and anti-political beliefs and take neoliberal positions in their political campaigns – are different. Milei is an extremist neoliberal, a staunch supporter of state reduction. Bolsonaro, although his economy minister tried to implement neoliberal policies, did not truly subscribe to this economic doctrine. As an MP, he opposed privatization and belonged to the parliamentary front, which never openly advocated state reduction. His position can be defined as that of national/nationalist development. His program, clearly conservative, was much more decisive in the conquest of power than Milei’s program.

Despite these differences, they all share the characteristics of Latin American populism. Symbols of this were Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil. Both dominated the political landscape of their countries for much of the 20th century. Peron died 50 years ago, but since his death the Peronists have won six of the last ten presidential elections in Argentina.

Vargas today is just a character in the history of Brazil. In reality, the Brazilian Republic is divided into two phases: before and after Vargas. Lula always wanted to be a kind of “new Vargas.” Milei, even paradoxically resorting to populist tones and practices, presents himself as the one who will put an end to Peronism!

A populist leader always positions himself as a defender of the poor and an enemy of corrupt political elites. He is not a party cadre, but a leader who dominates the party that supports him. The populist lives by personal relationships with the masses of the people, who are poorly politically organized and dependent on the well-being of the government. Populism protects the poor, but does not threaten the powerful who are loyal to it. This ambiguity, which would be even greater for the neoliberal Milei, goes a long way toward explaining populists’ difficulties in managing the economy at critical moments.

The electorate of a populist leader is driven not only by discontent and loss of social significance. Equally or even more important are the personal relations that are established between the leader and his followers. Where institutions and structures have failed, it is the charismatic politician with his strength and volition who will protect the citizens.

Populism is fueled by the frustration and resentment of those social groups that feel excluded from social progress. Be it the poor and minorities who guarantee Lula’s victory, those despairing over the Argentine government’s mistakes who voted for Milei, or the conservative middle-class Christians who support Bolsonaro, because they are scared by the rise of the left in Brazil.

But purely economic or cultural explanations for this opposition to traditional politicians are not enough. It is rather a combination of factors and ideas that give rise to a feeling of disrespect for one’s dignity and betrayal of agreements that guaranteed social stability.

In Latin America, in addition to the rational and bureaucratic social contract that guides liberal democracy, the traditional, personalistic, and moral pact in which those in power protect those under them is still alive in popular memory. When the social contract fails, the populist politician once again embodies this defensive, almost mythical leadership.

In this sense, we can understand the paradox of “neoliberal populism,” when the practice of strong and authoritarian government coexists with the proposal to minimize the government. If the state has failed (this is the ideological way), we reduce its structure and delegate power to a leader who will solve the problems.

However, coming to power does not guarantee success. To achieve this, a populist leader must present himself as strong, bold, and promise radical change. This is part of the game: you must act in such a way as to win the trust of the depressed and disillusioned voter. But to remain in power and fulfill, at least partially, the promises made, a charismatic leader needs realism, capable of mobilizing the political forces that he has condemned and beaten, but not destroyed, to overcome the real obstacles in governing the country.

Few leaders have the skills to deal with these two distinct issues. We don’t know what will happen to Milei in Argentina. Bolsonaro in Brazil has been unable to overcome the challenges of maintaining power. Lula turned out to be a master in this sense: by taking advantage of the clientelism of his opponents, he was able to create a political coalition that supported him in previous governments and, for better or worse, seems ready to support him now. His transformative practice, criticized by some of his associates, has been called “weak reformism” because it tends to avoid radical, controversial, or unattainable changes in favor of those that are guaranteed to be completed. Lula can be considered a role model for populist leaders.

But how does Latin American populism represent a warning to politicians trained in classical party structure who want to succeed without becoming populists?

Through two aspects. Firstly, by respecting citizens both in their material needs and in their moral and cultural choices. Making sacrifices in difficult times may not be easy, but it is possible when you have faith in leaders, when an individual voter feels respected and believes they are building a better future.

Secondly, proximity to people. No matter how rational and impersonal our society may be, people in difficult times seek human connection, an empathetic look, “social friendship” that shows them that they are not just parts of a social machine, but subjects of the nation.