France and Germany Engine Stalled

The Paris-Berlin night train, which, after a decade, returned to service in early December last year, was dubbed the Nightjet. Symbolically, this is good news for the health of relations between the two countries, but the scenario remains less than cheerful for those concerned about the fate of Europe. The French prefer the term “steam,” the Germans use the term “locomotive.” But the steam locomotive or the couple at the diamond wedding, if we proceed from the visions of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, appears in a worn, if not obsolete, dimension as a geopolitical concept. And as a driving force of European politics, it is being destroyed at a time when it should be working at full capacity. International crises (pandemic, war in Ukraine, conflict in the Middle East, energy supplies, USA-China clash) have been added to nearly mirror domestic problems.

In France, the fall of President Emmanuel Macron’s popularity is exacerbating his loss of a parliamentary majority. The extreme parties are growing, the hypothesis of early elections is intensifying, while polls take for granted that the extreme right-wing party of Marine Le Pen will be the leading party in the European elections. The social situation is explosive: constant protests, collective neuroses over insecurity, and growing episodes of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are indicators of a society divided and withdrawn. Macron’s speech at the Sorbonne in 2017, famous for re-proposing a grand European plan for development, integration, and common defense, was indeed a vision, as it got lost along the way.

Macron applied an old remedy, replacing the “fuse” that is the Prime Minister. He bid farewell to the worn-out Elisabeth Borne and handed the keys to Matignon to thirty-four-year-old Gabriel Attal. It was a media coup, as Attal is also the youngest Prime Minister in the history of the Republic (the reference to Napoleon, Emperor at 32, is obvious). However, the charisma of a brilliant technocrat is unlikely to be enough to clean up the country and implement reforms without a majority.

In Germany, a recent Constitutional Court ruling, rejecting a clumsy accounting system, has exposed deep cracks in the so-called “traffic light coalition,” the incompatibility of the views of the Greens and Liberals, as well as the difficulty in mediating Social Democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who acknowledges the fall of consensus, just as Macron. Germany’s debt remains contained, but unlike France, Germany is paying even more for severe infrastructure delays and the need to rethink energy sources that until yesterday were dependent on Russia. An issue that has called into question the historic decision to abandon nuclear power, which has divided public opinion and the government team on the issue.

In addition, Germany has also seen a strong rise of the extreme right, which has already affected the programs of government parties, particularly on immigration and border control. The ideal Franco-German engine proposal went in the opposite direction, namely a supportive and integrated development project. The change in perspective from Angela Merkel’s time is obvious. And the former chancellor, rejected by her party, slammed the door on the Adenauer Foundation, a pillar of the CDU’s cultural formation.

Internationally, with the war in Ukraine, there is also a difference in tone towards Russia, with clear disagreements over sourcing and energy reconversion. As for the commitments to strengthen European defense and military assistance to Ukraine, they have demonstrated inattention to the synergy of the respective military apparatus. France, as always, has staked its leadership role.

Germany has committed one hundred billion euros, strengthened its traditional partnership with the USA, but is forced to recognize its inferiority to Poland’s emerging military might. Naturally, from the Italians’ viewpoint, the difficulties of friendly countries will discourage self-consoling attitude. More than seventy years of “marriage” also precludes irreversible breakups. Rather, they emphasize moments of crisis that are usually overcome, even if the price is a downward compromise, as seen in the debate on Stability Pact reform: instead of finding solutions, division of problems prevails; dreams of an innovative revision of the rules have collided with the need to find common ground.

Two years ago, Macron called the debate on keeping the Maastricht criteria “a debate from another century.” The new pact risks making climate, economic sovereignty, and defense goals unlikely. EU expansion has also made relations between Paris and Berlin less “bilateral” in favor of multilateralism, even though the French and Germans still hold the best cards in the most decisive corridors of EU buildings. What is certain is that all of Europe is not capable of dealing with the challenges we face. The phrase “speak with one voice” now risks becoming a cliché, as obvious as it is unrealistic, especially since even the two major shareholders are not marching in unison. In this sense, Ukraine will be the first to notice the current situation.