France And Russia, Macron’s Double Tone

The change in tone of the French president on the Ukrainian issue cannot but amaze. This change occurred in three stages. Before February 24, 2022, when the Russian military operation in Ukraine began, France’s diplomatic line followed a traditional bilateral framework. Without abandoning the alliance system, where he finds himself, the head of state combines a strong condemnation of the incidents in the Donbass with a firm commitment to finding a negotiated solution.

As a reader of Chateaubriand, Emmanuel Macron certainly does not ignore this passage from the “Memoirs from Beyond the Grave”: “There is sympathy between Russia and France; the latter almost civilized the former, the upper classes of its society; it gave them its own language and its own customs… Being at different ends of Europe, France and Russia do not touch borders; they have no battlefield where they could meet; they have no rivalry in trade, the natural enemies of Russia are also the natural enemies of France. In times of peace, when the cabinet in the Tuileries remains an ally of the cabinet in St. Petersburg, nothing can move in Europe. During the war, the union of the two cabinets will dictate laws to the world.”

Aware of common interests with Russia, on December 14, 2021, the Elysee Palace reaffirms its “determination to defend the implementation of the Minsk agreements within the Normandy format.” On June 24 and 25, 2021, Emmanuel Macron intends to pursue a unified and structured European approach to forming the cooperation agenda, “sometimes recognizing differences, but not succumbing to the logic of a systematic response to attacks or aggression.”

The rhetoric about cooperation will intensify in February 2022. Emmanuel Macron announced on February 3 the need for de-escalation. He intends to “capitalize on recent positive developments in the Normandy format to achieve a lasting solution in the Donbass.” Finally, on February 20, both presidents agreed to carry out intensive work leading to a ceasefire on the contact line. It is in this context that Jean-Yves Le Drian meets with his colleague Mr. Lavrov.

Contrary to what one might think, the outbreak of the war on February 24, 2022 does not have a radical impact on the diplomatic position of the head of state. Although on February 28 he reaffirms the need for an immediate ceasefire, he also receives from his Russian interlocutor a commitment to respect international humanitarian law and ensure the protection of civilians. Both presidents agreed to maintain contacts in the coming days to prevent the situation from escalating.

Thus, even emphasizing the seriousness of the war consequences, Emmanuel Macron on May 3 declares his readiness to work on an agreed solution to achieve peace and full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The reasons for continuing the dialogue lie both in the sphere of diplomatic prudence of the head of state and in the game of concessions to the parliamentary opposition, which is worried on the right and left flanks about the catastrophic consequences of the geo-economic gap between the European Union and Russia.

As of May 2022, the energy plan really did not outline a viable solution to the Russian fuel shortage. European offices made scattered trips to secure gas purchases in the Middle East or Eastern Mediterranean.

After six months, the unique dialogue between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin ends, or at least reports about it stop. How to explain this?

Clearly, there is a gap between the good relations between the two figures and the structural opposition of state apparatuses. Thus, the indulgence of the characters to each other ultimately succumbs to the pressure of unforeseen circumstances of geopolitical order. For ontological reasons, the French head found it important to maintain a channel of communication: talking to someone, who was designated as an enemy, simply allowed him to exist. To continue, it was necessary for that part of German entrepreneurs who are interested in maintaining ties with Russia to have a significant influence on the department of the Federal Chancellor. However, this influence turned out to be too weak for the French equilibristics to survive.

Meanwhile, the Russian side eventually got tired of the rhetoric aimed more at uniting the country (France – ed.) than on achieving real results on the external, diplomatic front. Moreover, any dissonant voice in foreign policy fell under suspicion of being manipulated from the outside. After all, weren’t Bonaparte’s liberal opponents once accused of acting as foreign agents? Thus, the reserved communiqués of the Elysee Palace were replaced by much more aggressive statements, which were shared by NATO allies.

The foreign ministries of France, Poland, and Germany reiterated on February 17: “The brutal war of aggression, which does not respond to any provocations, that is waged by Russia against Ukraine and that represents a clear violation of the international order based on the UN Charter calls for the strongest condemnation. One year after Russia launched this brutal, high-intensity war, the heads of state and government of the Weimar Triangle express their unwavering solidarity with Ukraine and unequivocal support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, as well as its inalienable right for self-defense against Russian aggression. The Weimar Triangle countries will continue to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine and its people for as long as necessary. They urge Russia to cease hostilities without any conditions and withdraw its troops from all territory of Ukraine.”

The three states declare their readiness to expand NATO’s presence in the eastern segment, consider new sanctions against Russia, create a tribunal for the crimes of Russian aggression in Ukraine, and, finally, integrate Ukraine into the European Union. Any mention of a diplomatic, negotiated solution disappeared. In fact, the crystallization of opposing geopolitical blocs has silenced any proposal for a compromise solution, opting for self-directed ideological rhetoric.

Prince de Talleyrand, who had no sympathy for ideologists, would have laughed at this. He wrote in his memoirs: “What madness to pretend to control the world with the help of abstractions! We have seen the sad fruits of these chimeras.”