Nagorno-Karabakh: End Of Unborn State

Lodged between the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the devastating resurgence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the long-running dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh has ended with significant international indifference. The region, populated mainly by Armenians but placed within Azerbaijan by the Soviet authorities in the 1920s, after the collapse of the USSR managed – thanks to a victorious war – to become de facto independent in 1994, also occupying some adjacent and ethnically Azerbaijani territories. Thus, an independent, although not internationally recognized, republic was created, which received the ancient Armenian name of the region – Artsakh.

In this conflict, two legal principles collided: the principle of a country’s territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination of peoples. Relying on the protection of Moscow, with which Yerevan has long remained close in its political, economic, and security spheres (also becoming part of the Russian-led CSTO military alliance), the Armenians did not accept a compromise solution – a proposal, under which the OSCE Minsk Group worked in vain for decades. This intransigence is also shared by the Azerbaijanis, who, however, have all this time fully exploited their country’s significant energy resources to achieve enormous economic superiority, which soon also became military.

The event that should be considered the turning point in this story is the so-called “velvet revolution” of 2018, which brought to power in Yerevan a new leader, Nikol Pashinyan, who was less attached to the traditional alliance with Russia and rather turned towards the West. This new orientation, similar to that followed by neighboring Georgia after the collapse of the USSR and supported primarily by the young part of the Armenian population, apparently has not brought positive results to Yerevan. Firstly, because Pashinyan did not take advantage of his enormous popularity, which he initially enjoyed, to find a compromise with Baku on Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, geography itself prevents rapprochement with the West, the road to which passes through Turkey, the historical enemy of Armenia.

While Yerevan’s pro-Western turn was more rhetorical than efficient, it was nonetheless unwelcome in Moscow, which did not support the Armenians when Azerbaijan launched a successful attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2020. The ceasefire led to Armenia losing most of the territory it had acquired in 1994 and to the intervention of Russian peacekeeping forces.

This lack of Russian intervention can be explained by the fact that the Azerbaijani aggression affected not the Republic of Armenia but Nagorno-Karabakh that, from a legal standpoint, belongs to Azerbaijan. This justification, however, does not apply to Russian inaction in subsequent years, when Baku attacked the territory of the Republic of Armenia several times with impunity, occupying small strategic regions within it without Moscow’s intervention to protect its ally. Russia’s withdrawal also became apparent when Azerbaijan imposed a complete blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh in December 2022, depriving the Armenian population of food, energy, and medicine for many months.

Faced with the loss of traditional Russian protection, Yerevan sought new paths, but moved increasingly recklessly away from Moscow, declaring that it was a mistake to trust the country’s security to Russia for decades, strengthening military cooperation with the United States, and, finally, joining the International Criminal Court, which would lead to Putin’s arrest if he sets foot in Armenia. Yerevan also turned to the European Union, which was sensitive to this request for help and sent an unarmed mission to the Armenian border in March 2023 to monitor Azerbaijan’s actions. This was an important but completely ineffective innovation, as demonstrated by the new attack carried out by Baku in September of this year, and it happened precisely on those days when improvident joint Armenian-American military exercises took place, which Moscow apparently perceived as a provocation.

Thus, the resistance of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh was broken without Russian intervention. The entire Armenian population left the region forever, which is understandable given Baku’s complete lack of guarantees of autonomy and security in recent decades for the numerous individuals who participated in the political and military governance of the now dissolved Artsakh Republic.

Moreover, although little or no attention has been paid to this issue by the West – and by Italy in particular – Azerbaijan ranks at the very bottom of the international rankings for political freedoms. This outcome makes it possible, among other things, that Baku is repeating in Nagorno-Karabakh the policy of “cultural genocide” carried out in another historically Armenian region, Nakhichevan, also attributed to Baku in the Soviet era and where the entire Armenian artistic heritage (dozens of churches and thousands of khachkars, stone crosses, so characteristic of the art of this people) has been destroyed in recent decades.

However, no matter how painful the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh may be, it is the fate of Armenia itself that causes concern. Sandwiched between two hostile and much more powerful countries, such as Turkey (among other things, the heir to the nation that committed the 1915 genocide, never recognized by Ankara) and Azerbaijan, Armenia finds itself in a more complex geopolitical situation than ever before. At a meeting on September 25 this year, which, unsurprisingly, took place in Nakhichevan, Aliyev and Erdogan renewed the idea of creating a land link between Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenian territory. This clause was actually included, albeit unclearly, in the agreement that ended the conflict in 2020. But re-proposing this clause in today’s situation, when Nagorno-Karabakh no longer exists, obviously represents a more threatening development for Armenia.

Despite the assessment of the risky pro-Western political line pursued by the Yerevan leadership in recent years, the created situation threatens the very existence of the Republic of Armenia. Even if Russia continues to maintain a military base on the Armenian-Turkish border for the time being, and Iran offers Azerbaijan not to use force against Armenia, this country today will find itself essentially alone in the face of a superior Azerbaijan, which may decide to take advantage of the favorable situation, while having the opportunity to count on full support from Turkey.

In light of this dangerous situation, it would be absolutely necessary that the security of Armenia, which is no longer provided by Russia, be guaranteed in a new way. First of all, of course, from the USA and the European Union. But despite calls from Washington, Paris, and Berlin for Baku to respect the territorial integrity of Armenia, it is difficult to imagine that in the event of aggression, this country could receive Western support comparable to that received by the defense of Ukraine.

In this sense, defining a form of collective commitment in favor of Armenia’s security, which, without excluding Russia, presupposes the participation of the West, as well as major international players such as China and India, could become important proof of the existence of a new multipolar system, which is arising in pain from the ruins of the unipolar regime under US leadership.