Spain at the Crossroads

Undoubtedly, many outside observers point out that the parliamentary confirmation that allowed Pedro Sánchez to lead the Spanish government depended on the PSOE’s agreement with the Catalan pro-independence parties to pass the amnesty law. It will release or allow the return to the country of political leaders of these parties, prosecuted or convicted for attempting to achieve Catalan independence in a long process that ended in an illegal referendum organized by the Catalan autonomous government itself. Future amnesties include Oriol Junqueras, leader of Catalonia’s current ruling Republican Left of Catalonia party, who spent almost 4 years in prison, and Carles Puigdemont (leader of the Together for Catalonia party), who has been in exile in Belgium since November 2017.

To understand that the amnesty for repressed Catalan political leaders has become the basis of the most important political agreement in Spain in recent years (this is about the agreement that allowed the formation of the government of the fourth eurozone economy), we must accept that the principle of multinationalism is one of the main historical problems of Spanish politics. In Spain, as in Great Britain, Switzerland, or the Netherlands, there are citizens from different territories, with different languages, with related but different legal and political institutions and, above all, with different national identities and feelings. In the case of the Basque Country and Catalonia, this identity has resulted in a broad independence movement involving different segments of the population that are politically represented by some of the most powerful parties active there. However, the problem of multinationalism in Spain is not limited to Catalonia and the Basque Country. In Spain there are many more areas where multinationalism is expressed not only in popular sentiments, but also in openly autonomist political proposals. Here are some examples, to give readers an idea. The Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia (its identity and culture is often identified outside Spain as authentically Spanish) defines Andalusia as a “national reality.” Likewise, realities such as Galicia (the third historical nation in the Spanish state, which also has a significant pro-independence political party), Navarre as the historical heart of all things Basque, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands (territories where Catalan is spoken), Aragon (the historical center of the old kingdom), Leon that has always differed from Castile, or the Canary Islands as an example of extreme insular isolation, all show the territorial complexity of Spain, which is not always easy to appreciate from the outside.

The 1978 Constitution itself (agreed between the Francoist elites and the democratic opposition elites during the transition period) already distinguished between two types of territories in Spain – regions and nationalities, clearly recognizing the national character of some territories. This agreed constitution became the legal expression for a framework of coexistence that throughout decades regulated interethnic tensions by what was called the “autonomous state,” a form of territorial organization with many federal elements.

The transition period in Spain ended with the failure of the coup d’état on February 23, 1981, which strengthened the prestige of the monarchy, personified by Juan Carlos I of Bourbon, and the landslide victory of Felipe González in the 1982 general elections. Inter-party agreements, the Constitution itself, and the results of the elections in Spain brought about a party system that is crucial for ensuring the stability of our political system, for organizing the economic modernization of Spain within the framework of the European division of labor, and particularly for resolving conflicts arising from multinationalism. We could call it a 2+2 party system.

There are two major state parties: the PSOE, linked to the German SPD, which soon abandoned verbal radicalism and Marxism; on the other hand, the Popular Alliance, a Francoist party founded by 7 ministers of the dictatorship era, which, having absorbed at a certain point the Union of the Democratic Center of Adolfo Suarez, had no problem moving away from its roots and aligning itself with the Christian-democratic traditions of European popular parties. Let’s not forget that former prime minister Aznar ultimately saw himself as the successor to Republican President Manuel Azaña, who died in exile in France after the civil war.

The two main parties of the Spanish system were joined by the two others, the “alpha males” of the Catalan and Basque political subsystems. On the one hand, there is the Basque People’s Party, strengthened by ETA terrorism, as the only recognized Basque choice to achieve self-government in its own special way. On the other hand, there is the Convergence and the alliance of Jordi Pujol as hegemon in Catalonia, where the socialists have negated the huge initial expectations of the United Socialist Party of Catalonia (Communist Party of Catalonia), which at one time even resembled the Italian Communist Party. What came to be called the “cafe for all” (autonomous state) was a solution, the symmetry of which with other territories did not correspond to the asymmetrical multinational reality, but made it possible to counter the controversial Section 8 of the Constitution and helped to ensure stability, organize administrative decentralization, give Catalans and Basques space to maneuver, and negotiate their own competencies (for example, their regional police).

The main thing about this 2+2 party system is that all four parties agreed on the main economic policies that Spain should pursue within the EU, all four accepted the NATO umbrella as the best possible option, all four accepted, albeit with varying enthusiasm, the monarchy. This political foundation ensured for more than three decades that the forces, which existed parallel to the party system (economic oligarchies, the media, the always very conservative judiciary, and the more radical layers generated by the old repressive apparatus), were not as visible in politics as now.

So, what has happened over the past 15 years that amnesty has become the key word for understanding today’s Spanish politics? It was the emergence of the Catalan independence movement and Podemos, the first national-scale left-wing party that defended the right to self-determination. These two players have disrupted Spain’s party system, the only power structure that citizens can change by voting. The obvious proof is that the current coalition government (the second in the last 40 years, after the Podemos participation in it in 2020) was only possible after agreeing on the amnesty law with supporters of Catalan independence. Omar Encarnacion recently wrote in the New York Times that the amnesty agreement is a bold attempt to end the Catalan crisis and offer a way out of Spain’s hopeless dead-end. I agree with the second, but not with the first. The Catalan crisis is one of the key ones in the problem of multinationalism, which is far from being resolved. In fact, the problem has not been solved for more than 200 years.

What is at stake in Spain now is who will lead the inevitable reform of the state and political regime. Authorities, not subject to democratic control, including the elite judiciary, are aware of this conflict and have taken a stand. There is also a monarchy that has written off progressive and multinational Spain and does not stop making gestures towards the right as accomplices. This anti-amnesty bloc represents a reaction to the democratic impulse that followed the great economic crisis of 2008.

What will happen? In my opinion, there are two ways. Either the government, together with its parliamentary partners, adopts a strategy of state reform in a confederal manner, or the right and far right will come to power and begin the process of recentralization.

But one thing is certain. Spain will no longer be the same as it was after the transition period.