War Between China and Taiwan is Unlikely

Moscow and Beijing emphasize their strong friendship and shared desire to change the international order so that it is no longer dominated by the West. If not true allies, they are important partners to each other. China is helping Russia circumvent Western sanctions but not supplying it with weapons. Ties between Russia and the Western world have been severed for a long time, while Beijing wants to maintain the relationships that are essential to its economic viability and therefore to the legitimacy of the Communist Party.

Since the start of the war launched by Moscow against Ukraine in February 2022, the question of a repeat of the aggressive scenario in Asia with a war to be launched by China against Taiwan has been regularly asked and discussed. Many American strategists believe it is inevitable. China’s official goal, repeated over and over again by its leaders, is indeed reunification. Beijing is intransigent: it wants to isolate Taiwan and only maintains diplomatic relations with countries that don’t have them with the island. The list of countries that still recognize Taiwan is steadily shrinking to 12. Beijing also makes sure that Taiwan cannot be part of the UN system, including the World Health Organization. Officially, the reunification is to be accomplished peacefully, however, Beijing has not ruled out the need to resort to military means. It creates an atmosphere of threats.

The principle of “one nation, two systems,” enacted under Deng Xiaoping after the return of Hong Kong by the United Kingdom, was to serve as a model for Taiwan’s reintegration into mainland China.

The people of Taiwan now strongly reject this reunification, seeing what has become of the “one nation, two systems” concept in Hong Kong, transformed into the “one nation, one system” Beijing concept.

Only 3% of Taiwanese are in favor of reunification. The January 13 presidential election demonstrated a commitment to the status quo: not a formal declaration of independence, which everyone thought would be a trigger for war, but benefiting from de facto independence. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, and the island’s GDP per capita is higher than that of mainland China (US$34,000 compared to US$12,500). Unofficial recognition does not prevent the multiplication of connections. The most important countries do not have embassies there, but they do have representative offices, and bilateral relations are maintained.

Therefore, will Xi Jinping not be tempted to use force for full reunification, which has become impossible to achieve peacefully? This is why the parallel between China – Taiwan and Russia – Ukraine persistently returns.

But this comparison is too superficial to be true. The differences are numerous and noticeable. First of all, Beijing noted the difficulties caused by Vladimir Putin’s use of war. The latter would have more advantages in maintaining indirect pressure on Ukraine. Even though Russia has actually gained some Ukrainian territory, it is weakened. We must not forget that China is the land of Sun Tzu, whose lesson is that the best way to win a war is not to fight battles. There is another significant difference from the situation in Ukraine: Taiwan is an island, so invading it requires embarking on a more complex operation than crossing the border with tanks and infantry. Sure, the Chinese navy has strengthened, but the landing points in Taiwan are not as numerous and are well defended. The Taiwanese army has been preparing for war for a long time and is better equipped, better trained – and less corrupt – than the Ukrainian army. Moreover, while Joe Biden has repeatedly said he would not intervene if Moscow goes to war against Ukraine, he has, on the other hand, insisted that he would come to Taiwan’s aid. So far, American policy has been characterized by strategic ambiguity: Washington was reluctant to say what its intentions were in advance and kept Beijing waiting. Turning to war would cause an economic crisis in China. However, it is access to consumption and the fulfillment of material needs that provides the Communist Party with much of its legitimacy. Chinese nationalists would no doubt be happy to take back Taiwan, but consumers might easily think the price to pay is too high for too undefined an outcome. It is not certain that Beijing wants to risk World War III by betting that the United States will stay out of the conflict, only to find that it comes to the rescue on Taiwan’s side.

Of course, there is a risk of an unwinding situation, a poorly controlled reaction, and we cannot completely eliminate the risk of conflict. But deterrence and mutual interest come into play, and Beijing must think it has more to lose than to gain if it launches a military operation that would force many countries in the Global South to back away from China and deprive China of the South’s attractiveness argument against Washington. It would no longer be able to position itself as a great peace-loving power, unlike Washington, which has fueled conflicts by supplying arms to Ukraine and Israel.

China cannot officially renounce reunification, but it can say – and let everyone else say – that this goal can be postponed until 2049, the centennial of the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing can step up military maneuvers, even incursions into Taiwan’s airspace, without crossing the threshold of war.

Taiwan does not claim its independence, but continues to exist in a sometimes-troubled environment, and yet this does not prevent it from moving forward. A fragile status quo, but it is preferable to any other solution.