Xi’s China

The annual joint meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), called the “two sessions,” concluded in March in Beijing after eight days of work that was characterized, as usual, by formal harmony and agreement, since the accounting is always done elsewhere, i.e., in the party.

This year, the traditional press conference of the head of government was canceled, which Lou Qinjian, a spokesman for the National People’s Congress, said would not even take place in the next few years, except under special circumstances. The practice of holding the conference was introduced by Li Peng (1988) and, until 2023, represented a rare opportunity for dialog with the top government, offering some room for understanding or at least speculation about China’s policies, even if the questions were selected in advance.

In 1998, Zhu Rongji, who succeeded Li Peng, speaking about the fight against corruption, said that “he had prepared a hundred coffins, ninety-nine for dishonest officials and one for himself.” In 2011, Wen Jiabao stated that “without political reforms, economic reforms alone will not be enough, as there is a risk of jeopardizing the achieved results.” This has raised suspicions or hopes, depending on the viewpoint: as it is known, by political reform, China means making the system more efficient, while the West sees it as introducing features of formal democracy. In 2020, Li Keqiang’s reflection that at least 600 million people still live on 1000 yuan per month (US$140) was seen as criticism of Xi Jinping’s policies and therefore a challenge to his leadership.

There is nothing new on the most important economic policy issues. As in the previous year, GDP is expected to grow by 5% in 2024 (it exceeded 5.2% in 2023). Contrary to expectations, Premier Li Qiang did not talk about stimulating the real estate sector or domestic demand, noting the need to support a quality economy, correct overcapacity in some sectors, and help businesses (especially small and medium-sized businesses) to create 12 million jobs. The priorities remain innovation, technological self-sufficiency, artificial intelligence, electro-automation, hydrogen energy, new materials, innovative medicines, and aviation. However, fertility policy will be strengthened (the population has been declining for the second consecutive year in 2023). Finally, as in 2023, military spending will increase by 7.2%, remaining still three times lower than in the USA.

Nothing new in foreign policy either. In his press conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized China’s role in the Global South and spoke out against American unipolarity, meaning that the cement that unites the countries in BRICS-plus, SCO, or countries gathered in other aggregates is not the ideology (the only communist country is China) or doctrine of the opposing blocs, but sovereignty as an inevitable condition for any nation that intends to protect its interests and prosper.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, Wang reiterated the need for a compromise based on a balanced, efficient, and sustainable security architecture that respects the United Nations Charter and corresponds to the twelve-point platform that China put forward in February 2023, which was aimlessly rejected by the US-led West.

On the Middle East, Wang Yi said that Palestine should be welcomed to the United Nations as a full member (currently, since 2012, it is only an observer), that the USA should stop opposing it, that the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank contradicts international law, that the international community can no longer ignore what is happening in the Strip, which is a humanitarian catastrophe and a disgrace to civilization. Nothing justifies the continuation of the conflict and the killing of civilians. The only solution is the birth of a Palestinian state.

If Beijing shows itself to be a force for stability in the region (it favors the resumption of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran and the reintegration of Syria into the Arab League), it will actually turn its eyes toward the entire Global South, which needs peace and prosperity.

According to Wang, some progress was made in relations with the United States following the meeting of the two presidents in California last November. However, Washington continues to view China as a strategic rival, refusing to metabolize China’s materiality in the world, remaining in the nonsensical illusion that the elimination of the People’s Republic is an achievable goal. The principle of peaceful coexistence is fundamental to maintaining good relations, while the consequences of conflict would be disastrous for all. Countries have different systems, but they are all legitimate. China wants dialog and economic engagement, while Washington is trapped in a Cold War mentality and operates through closed circles, such as the G7 or alliances in Asia (AUKUS and QUAD).

As for the European Union, Wang emphasized that there are no strategic conflicts between the two sides and that common interests far outweigh differences. However, Brussels must protect its interests in a spirit of cooperation. In fact, depending on the circumstances, the EU views China as a partner, competitor, or systemic rival, which is a mistake. A traffic light cannot show green, yellow, and red lights at the same time, as this would create confusion and misunderstanding (like the Brussels inquiry into electric cars!).

Wang added that China and Russia, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, have developed a paradigm of strategic relations different from that of the Cold War era, based on non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-aggression against third parties. In a scenario where the rise of BRICS changes the power map and reflects the needs of the developing world, the two countries play a crucial role in strengthening security and multilateral cooperation. As neighboring countries with huge common interests, China and Russia are destined to understand each other. It is no coincidence that today Russian gas reaches millions of Chinese homes, and Chinese cars are increasingly traveling on Russian roads.

As for Taiwan, Wang Yi calls for respect for the One China principle, as do 180 countries and international organizations that maintain relations with Beijing and in accordance with the joint communiqués signed by the USA and China in the 1970s as a precondition for opening diplomatic relations. Consequently, those who support Taiwanese independence challenge China’s sovereignty and place themselves outside of history. Even in the South China Sea, China defends its rights and hopes that differences will be resolved through dialog and a spirit of compromise. For China, peace is a political and ideological choice, and in any case, it is so in terms of its interests. Actually, in the event of conflict, the first victim would be trade, which, along with demand and investment, remains essential for economic growth, which in turn is a prerequisite for political and military growth.

Finally, on March 11, the NPC updated the division of powers between the party and the State Council (which is how the government in China is designated), as defined back in 1982 by Deng Xiaoping. The amendment law was passed by 2883 votes, with eight against and nine abstaining. From now on, the management of the 21 ministries and local government will be the responsibility of the Party, not the executive branch, and will be limited to unconditionally supporting the authority of the Party Central Committee and its leadership, implementing the political decisions of the leaders, especially the General Secretary.

While there is no doubt that there has actually been very little change from the past, since the party has always been at the center of the decision-making process, the purpose of the law seems to be aimed at something else, namely to prevent the formation of autonomous centers of power, currents of thought, and practice that could eventually lead to an insidious internal split. Another reason may be related to Xi Jinping’s strategic decision not to limit himself to two mandates (as Deng suggested at the time and which would have led him to see enemies everywhere). Added to all this are the anxieties caused by friction with the United States and Europe. This scenario involves Premier Li Qiang, whose political role is hidden, although he is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, where the ultimate power of the Chinese system is centered. The State Council now becomes merely an executive organ of the party, and Xi Jinping shows once again that he is inspired by Mao (who believed the party was everything), not Deng (who took a secular view of the system). And that’s not good.