1823-2023: Old Monroe Doctrine Tool With Greater Relevance

The foreign policy of the United States is turning two centuries old. Whether adopted with firm resolve by various presidents or revised to limit its consequences, the Monroe Doctrine continues to be the guiding light for Washington's power projection around the world.

The founding concept of American foreign and security policy was formulated exactly two centuries ago by President James Monroe in his December 1823 State of the Union Address. He thus laid the foundations for the famous “doctrine” in its title, which was destined to become the norm in American political life: The USA will not interfere in European affairs and will recognize existing colonies in the New World; on the other hand, any attempt by the European powers to extend their influence into any part of America thereafter would be regarded as a hostile gesture. This Monroe Declaration, often interpreted as the Bible of American isolationism – a meaning it acquired only later – was a direct response to the interventionist policies of the European powers. Particularly, in connection with the project of the Spanish expedition, supported by France, aimed at restoring the colonial rule of Madrid in Latin America, as well as in relation to the ambitions of Russia, which, by decree of September 1821, decided that the North Pacific Ocean, from the Bering Strait to the 51st latitude, was to be reserved for trade and possibly Russian occupation. This step was taken after the possibility of a joint declaration with England was ruled out, so as not to find itself with tied hands in the face of further developments in Latin America, while taking British support for granted in the event of escalation of tensions with the European powers. In fact, the new British Foreign Secretary Canning, who had liberal sympathies and was interested in keeping Latin American ports open to British ships and trade, had already made it clear in October to the French ambassador in London, Polignac, that if France intervened, England would have to “look after its own interests.” It is therefore widely believed that the Monroe Declaration that forms the basis of the famous “doctrine” was proclaimed under the cover of the British fleet. In December 1845, on the occasion of the annexation of Texas, President James Polk reaffirmed the “principle” of Mr. Monroe’s Declaration, further clarifying that if the United States annexed a hitherto independent American state, no European power had the right to intervene, citing the principle of a balance of power, completely alien to the dynamics of the American continent.

Twenty years later, after the Civil War, the United States forced the evacuation of French troops from Mexico in a revolt against Maximilian Habsburg, invoking the Monroe Doctrine.

At the end of the century, President Cleveland took advantage of the territorial dispute between England and Venezuela to impose his concept of “enhanced Monroeism,” according to which no question concerning the American continent could be considered or decided without the participation of the United States.

With Theodore Roosevelt, at the beginning of the new century, the Monroe Doctrine was transformed into a tool for asserting Washington’s strategic control over at least the sector of the Western Hemisphere closest to US territory, i.e., continental and island Central America. This was done by adding a corollary, named after its author – Roosevelt. The President, in his message to Congress in December 1904, stated that “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”

As a result, Washington accepted military intervention in the American republics, but reserved it only for itself and excluded the Europeans on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine. After World War I, the United States received explicit reference to the compatibility of the Monroe Doctrine with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and this contributed to the widespread application of the policy of intervention, according to the Roosevelt Corollary, in the Antilles and Central America.

The rise of the Democrats to the presidency imposed a noticeable limitation, which was then significantly reduced with the rotation of Republicans into the presidency. But finally, in December 1928, Clark’s memorandum stated that the Monroe Doctrine was a declaration addressed to Europe, not Latin America. Published only two years later, this document was seen by some commentators as an official denial of Roosevelt’s investigation.

However, this denial is not conclusive, given that Reagan used it repeatedly during the crises in Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua between 1983 and 1985. And George W. Bush did the same during the invasion of Panama in 1989, citing two presidents: only the Monroe Doctrine. More closely related to its original spirit was Kennedy’s invocation of the 1947 Rio Pact during the 1962 Cuban Crisis.

As recently as 2013, Democratic Secretary of State John Kerry told a meeting of the Organization of American States that the Monroe Doctrine era was over. Trump expressed exactly the opposite view at the UN General Assembly in September 2018, saying that the official US policy since President Monroe had been to reject foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere. This stated a contrast not only with foreign intervention, but also with foreign influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Thus, President Trump confirmed the statement that the Monroe Doctrine was very much alive, made several months earlier by his national security adviser John Bolton, who – albeit briefly in this position – mentioned access to this sensitive body of the presidential administration of neoconservative orientations, which then were perpetuated by his successors in the new Democratic administration.

Confirmation of the continuation of this trend was seen in a recent statement by Biden, who confirmed the nature of the American “Yard,” which is no longer in the back, but in front of “everything that is found… beyond the Mexican border.” Argentina’s recent accession to Brazil in the BRICS format, as well as the desire of other Latin American countries to do the same, cast doubt on whether everything south of Mexico can truly continue to be the “backyard” of the United States.

International relations historian, vice-president of the Atlantic Committee, guest lecturer at St. Petersburg University

AntonGiulio de Robertis