Is Taiwan Worth a War?

The presidential election held in Taiwan on January 13 was won by Lai Ching-te (William Lai), the outgoing vice president of the Republic of China (which is Taiwan’s official name). Lai, whose inauguration is scheduled for May 20, is the leading representative of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that has governed the island for the past eight years.

Outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen, the first woman to win the election, and twice in a row (2016 and 2020), stepped down as party chairwoman last autumn after a clear defeat in local elections. However, Tsai was not eligible for re-election due to term limits.

According to Taiwanese electoral law, anyone who receives at least one vote more than the other candidates (first-majority system) is declared the winner. Thus, Lai becomes president despite the fact that he only got 40.05% of the vote, as his opponents received 33.49% (Hou Yu-ih, the current mayor of Taipei, from the Nationalist Kuomintang Party, KMT) and 26.46% (Ko Wen-je, People’s Party, TPP), respectively. The losing parties failed to agree on a slate of candidates, missing a historic opportunity. Turnout was 71.86% (–3.04% compared to 2020), and for the first time since 2000, the winning candidate fell below the 50% vote threshold.

If this election was the key to testing the will of the Taiwanese to take the difficult path to independence, it must be concluded that this will has declined significantly from four years ago. Not only is Lai elected with 40% of the vote compared to the more than 50% received by Tsai Ing-wen in 2020, but in addition, his party loses its majority in parliament, making governance cumbersome and further alienating a prospect that the DPP, aware of the risks, did not seriously consider even when it had an absolute majority in parliament.

In this regard, most “independent” analysts believe that the only possibility that could prompt Beijing to consider the use of force – and in any case, it would not be a walk in the park, since the Taiwanese military has advanced weaponry supplied over the years by the United States – would be a declaration of independence for the island. But why should the Taiwanese leadership go down this path, incurring the wrath of the universe – a hypothetical naval blockade, infrastructure breakdown, loss of life, and other devastation – when Taiwan is, in fact, already independent? This could only happen if the Taiwanese leadership succumbs to the flattery or bribery of the USA, whose goal is to destabilize the country that most threatens their imperial hegemonism in the world.

After the election, former U.S. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, who landed in Taiwan with provocative timeliness and was accompanied by a group of former senior U.S. officials, expressed “the congratulations from the American people” to the president-elect. The latter, for his part, replied that he was “grateful to the United States for its strong support for Taiwanese democracy and enduring mutual partnership.” The White House spokesman, after reaffirming the depth of relations with Taiwan, which will continue to be governed by the same party under William Lai, then declared that “America’s commitment to the island’s cause remains solid as a rock, based on principles of universal consensus” and “in favor of friends,” words that, beyond their ambiguity, imply that Washington expects the island to continue submitting to American strategic priorities in exchange for hypothetical protection in the face of an even more hypothetical threat.

But while Secretary of State Anthony Blinken congratulated “the strength of Taiwanese democracy,” President Biden, in an unusual moment of realist regret, used more conciliatory emphases, reaffirming that “in any case, the United States does not support the island’s independence.” This position is consistent with the recognition of the existence of unified China and the joint communiqués that, beginning in the late 1970s, authorized the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

On the Chinese front, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning, while branding the visit by former senior U.S. officials as “untimely,” reiterated “China’s traditional, firm opposition to any outside interference in the Taiwan issue, an issue that Beijing considers a matter of exclusive national concern.”

Meanwhile, just a day after Lai’s victory, another nation – Nauru, with a population of just over 12,000, the world’s smallest – suspends political relations with Taiwan, which is now recognized by only twelve countries.

U.S. strategy, despite Biden’s unexpectedly softened lexicon, continues to fan the flames. The conflict between Beijing and Taiwan has essentially stopped the locomotive of the country, the People’s Republic, which represents the most dangerous challenge to American hegemony. Washington will use every means to slow China’s growth. Even in the absence of a mutual defense agreement with Taiwan, based on consolidated strategic ambiguity, the U.S. raises a possibility (nothing more than a possibility, however) of military intervention, if Beijing decides to pursue unification through armed forces. The ideal prospect for Washington remains a conflict indirectly with Taiwan, with the island’s human, material, and industrial resources, similar to the NATO and U.S. war against Russia indirectly through Ukraine, given that direct conflict between the two nuclear powers is impossible for obvious reasons.

Finally, regarding Taiwan, current President Xi Jinping is following a reflection that Deng Xiaoping consigned to history back in 1979. According to the latter, unification “is a historical mission of the Chinese nation shared by all its children,” but suggested that the rhetoric of forced liberation be dropped. If that is not possible today, according to Deng, “then the issue should be deferred to future generations of leaders in Beijing and Taipei, when political conditions allow.”

Meanwhile, Xi Jinping said compatriots on both sides of the strait “are called upon to work together to defeat the temptation of independence, promote the rejuvenation of the nation, and safeguard the country’s sovereignty and integrity.”

For the past thirty years, China has always adhered to the 1992 Consensus. That year, at a historic meeting in Hong Kong, the two sides agreed on the existence of “one China,” including the mainland and islands, i.e., those controlled by Beijing and those under Taipei’s control. In this case, however, the crucial theme of sovereignty was left aside, and the meaning to be given to the phrase “one China” was left to the parties to freely interpret according to the classical Chinese oxymoron tradition.

Although the Consensus represented the basis of Beijing’s relations with Taiwan, the latter changed its position over time. In fact, in 2016, as soon as she came to power, Tsai Ing-wen abandoned the meaning of the 1992 agreements, investing in a medium-term vision of China becoming a country “with a liberal democracy like Taiwan.”

Beijing believes that reunification with the island can be achieved without resorting to force, and to this end, trusting centuries of history, it uses economic leverage as an instrument of seduction (the island’s first trade and investment partner, logically enough, is the PRC), extending the boundaries of Deng’s ingenious formula – one country, two systems, already applied to Hong Kong and Macau – which is offered to Taiwan, enriched with further autonomist characteristics, thus trying to overcome Taiwanese resistance, even if for the moment to no avail.

In conclusion, despite biased interpretations, Xi Jinping has never given an exact timeframe for the resolution of the Taiwan issue, despite repeatedly noting that it cannot be postponed indefinitely.

In 2012, the newly elected General Secretary of the Communist Party, Xi Jinping, explained that the Chinese nation’s dream centers on two centuries: a) becoming a moderately wealthy society by the CPC’s centennial (2021); and b) full national renaissance by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic (2049).

According to some analyses (but convincing evidence is scarce), Beijing could link the times of reunification to an era of rejuvenation, an idea to which no one has so far been able to give a convincing meaning.