NATO: No, Yes, Maybe

NATO is obviously a hot topic, disproving the myth that foreign policy is a boring or useless subject during election campaigns, as can be seen in the U.S. presidential election. The President’s sweepstakes is unnecessary because what matters in the U.S. debate over the Alliance are the terms of the issue, the means, and the options available for different scenarios.

Relevant terms include burdens between allies (which can be called burden sharing or burden shifting) and strategic priorities (Russia, the Balkans and Black Sea region, NATO’s Southern region, the Indo-Pacific region).

The means are: legal instruments, finances, forces, political influence, and strategic communication. Finally, choices and scenarios depend, at least structurally, on the previous aspects. The dispute over this burden began in 1949, when Congress decided that the U.S. contribution in the form of naval forces and strategic aviation would be a good complement to the deployment of a strong European land force. That didn’t happen, because all the European countries were depleted, so Truman decided to send in ground and tactical air forces.

Therefore, this is a highly political and rarely objective discussion: comparing the ratio of GDP to defense spending between the USA and the Europeans is misleading, since the former spend a fraction of their budget (well below the agreed 2%) on defense in Europe. Worse yet, money spent on defense does not automatically translate into concrete combat capabilities.

This division of labor exists. U.S. forces have global influence, while European forces are focused on defending NATO’s European borders or acting as an auxiliary force outside the Alliance’s area, providing ground troops in exchange for U.S. global logistical support. The Pacific, barring symbolic European gestures, remains a theater of war ruled by Washington.

Based on practical common sense, it seems quite obvious that European allies cannot afford the luxury of strategic dilemmas. At least four major states have substantially lost their great power status since World War II and are forced to concentrate on the continent (Russia, the Balkans and Black Sea, the Mediterranean), with the added secondary concern for some less important and more distant interests, in Africa and the Persian Gulf.

It seems clear that, regardless of the president, the U.S. government has two priorities: rebuilding the social and economic base of the United States and thwarting China’s growing power. The current president has been very cautious about Ukraine and the recent conflict in the Gaza Strip, precisely because these two priorities are and will remain fundamental, like it or not. In any case, all presidents continue to believe that U.S. hegemony should be maintained virtually forever.

What tools could increase cohesion between allies? The Congressional Joint Statement, which should prevent the President from attempting to withdraw, suspend, or reduce NATO commitments, is encouraging, but it can be quickly reversed or circumvented. A victorious president could convince Congress after victory, and worse, the statement does not address options such as reducing actual political leadership, cutting troops, or withdrawing from an integrated military structure.

Finances and forces are powerful levers in the hands of European allies, provided concrete results emerge within 4 to 8 years. In principle, ready-to-use forces are a more valuable asset than money, as a great deal of duplication and waste in European armies can be cut. Political influence remains largely driven, in both directions, by consensus in NATO discussions. Everything in the Alliance is decided by consensus, which dispels the notion that it is a passive tool of Washington. On the other hand, Europe lacks serious strategic communications, despite the resources expended, due to the lack of strong political leadership. Ursula von der Leyen attempted to establish some “geopolitical” communication, but the results were mixed.

So, the post-presidential scenarios are as follows: retreat, reshuffle, and hemorrhage.

In the worst-case scenario, the United States will withdraw from the North Atlantic Alliance, as it did with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); at this point, there are two possible outcomes: the end of NATO (an irrevocable loss for all) or moving forward without America. The move forward could be a long-term wait in anticipation of the American return (as happened with France and Greece, which withdrew from the integrated military structure) or a medium-term shift to a serious common defense.

In both cases, the priority for Europe would be a credible conventional deterrence and working together for Ukraine. This is because the alternative cannot be the classic “butter or guns,” since butter is sine qua non for any political choice. The EU cannot generate sufficient wealth for its defense and simultaneously for the rearmament and rebuilding of Ukraine: there needs to be a division of tasks between Europe, which is rearming while rebuilding Kiev, and the USA, which is re-equipping Ukrainian forces. Among other things, Kiev’s accession to the EU cannot happen for at least a decade if we are to create a functional European and Ukrainian economy. Without it, European and Atlantic security would be fatally stifled.

In both cases, the five major European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) must begin concrete coordination of supplies, budgets, and important defense policy decisions. In any case, the role of the United States (full or residual) in nuclear deterrence will be one of the most thorny issues.

A hemorrhage would be the second worst-case scenario. At first sight, everything would be more or less the same, but the political direction, the decisive national contribution, and the troops would be gradually reduced by Washington. If Russia’s intentions remain the same, it is unlikely that Moscow will have the means and serious intentions to attack any NATO member. But ultimately European security would be jeopardized by renewed nationalist divisions, related border or “cultural” disputes, and logical heavy Russian interference.

Finally, the realignment scenario seems the best alternative, reassuring “so that nothing changes”: more European forces would be deployed at NATO’s borders, more defense spending by Canada and European allies, more U.S. resources would be allocated to the Pacific, with the ironclad guarantee of Article 5.

However, unless the rebuilding of common European security is restored by disarmament/transparency treaties and serious political-military agreements between the various strategic players, Ukraine will remain a millstone around Europe’s neck. A third Ukrainian war will be patiently waiting just around the corner, and along with it, a world war in the Pacific.